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INTRODUCTION
The ongoing U.S. “War on Terror” has prompted calls for the
1
2
resumption of a military draft and fear of the same, along with
3
official denials that a draft is anticipated. Such exchanges have a
familiar ring and are virtually identical to those circulating during the
4
Persian Gulf War. In 1980, when draft registration resumed after a
5
6
five-year hiatus, similar draft anxiety circulated. The Cold War
1. See Joel Brinkley, Defying Odds, 2 Lawmakers Push to Bring Back the Draft, N.Y.
TIMES ONLINE, Jan. 27, 2003, at http://www.nytimes.com/2003/01/27/politics/
27cnd-draft.html (reporting that two senior Democratic members of Congress urged
their colleagues to support legislation calling for the reinstatement of the draft for
men and women aged eighteen to twenty-six); Darryl Fears, 2 Key Members of Black
Caucus Support Military Draft, WASH. POST, Jan. 3, 2003, at A8 (stating that two
prominent members of the Congressional Black Caucus expressed support for a
nationwide military draft).
2. See Elaine Rivera, For Students, Time to Wonder and Worry, WASH. POST, Jan. 30,
2003, at B3 (discussing the apprehensions of high school students facing the
prospect of war with Iraq and the possible implementation of a draft); Michael
Corkery, Uncertainty Looms Large on College Campuses, PROVIDENCE J., Sept. 22, 2001, at
A1 (reporting that Providence area college students worry about possible war and a
draft).
3. See Defenselink, DoD Briefing—Secretary Rumsfeld and Gen. Meyers (Jan. 7,
2003),
at
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jan2003/t01072003_t0107sd.html
(quoting Secretary of Defense, Donald H. Rumsfeld as saying that the Pentagon is
not planning to reimplement a draft) (on file with author); Lisa Hoffman,
Reinstitution of Military Draft All but Ruled Out, CINCINNATI POST, Sept. 20, 2001, at 10A
(quoting assurances from Defense Secretary Rumsfeld and others that no draft is
envisioned).
4. See Keith Harriston, Students Anxious Over Mideast; While Supportive of U.S.
Action, Many Fear a Draft, WASH. POST, Sept. 4, 1990, at D1 (presenting student views
on the possibility of war in the Persian Gulf and on a draft that, if called, would not
exempt college students); Bill McCallister, Officials Deny Plan to Revive Draft, But
Rumors Persist, WASH. POST, Feb. 3, 1991, at A23 (reporting that the White House and
the Department of Defense (DoD) uniformly discounted rumors of reviving the
draft).
5. See Carter Signs Registration Law, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 1980, at A7 (reporting
President Jimmy Carter’s approval of the congressional resolution that provided
funding for renewed registration); see also Doug Bandow, Draft Registration: The Politics
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events that precipitated the draft’s return, however, had not resulted
7
and would not result in armed U.S. conflict.
An examination of the modern U.S. armed forces, evolving world
affairs, and domestic political and social forces strongly indicates that
8
the United States is unlikely to reinstitute a military draft. In fact,
the possibility of a military draft has become so remote that Selective
Service, which administers draft registration and would administer a
9
draft if one were reestablished, appears increasingly isolated from
10
Within this isolation, Selective Service
national defense policy.
continues to impose a gender-specific requirement of registration on
11
young men. To encourage compliance, Selective Service promotes
12
and orchestrates a variety of punitive actions against violators.
of Institutional Immortality, POL’Y ANALYSIS, No. 214, at 3 (Aug. 15, 1994), available at
http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-214.html (explaining that Congress initiated
military draft registration during World War I, reinstituted it for World War II, again
shortly after World War II, and the practice continued until 1975).
6. See James Barron, Students’ Anger and Approval Evoked by Call on Draft, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 25, 1980, at A12 (presenting reactions of U.S. college students to
President Carter’s proposal for a renewal of registration, with the students divided
between support for such legislation and fear that such action would result in a
draft); 76% in Poll Say War Is Likely in a Few Years, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 1981, at A8
(reporting that three out of four Americans polled indicated that war was inevitable
and that popular support for the draft was declining); see also Carter Says Registration Is
Not a Major Sacrifice, N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 1980, at A8 (reporting President Carter’s
assurance to young men subject to registration that an actual draft was not
envisioned).
7. See NOEL E. FIRTH & JAMES H. NOREN, SOVIET DEFENSE SPENDING: A HISTORY OF
CIA ESTIMATES, 1950-1990, at 210-211 (1998) (explaining that Soviet military
manpower and military construction increased since 1967 and chronicling events in
the mid-1980s that led Soviet leaders to anticipate a war with the United states that
never came).
8. See infra notes 276-84 and accompanying text (arguing that the United States
is unlikely to reinstitute the draft).
9. See The Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. 76-783, 54
Stat. 885 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 301-309(a) (2000)) (creating the
Selective Service to administer the first peacetime draft).
10. See Doug Bandow, Time to Kill Draft Registration, TODAY’S COMMENTARY (Aug.
10, 1999), at http://www.cato.org/dailys/08-10-99.html (relating the DoD position
that registration has little measurable effect on military mobilization or recruitment)
(on file with author).
11. See Military Selective Service Act of 1967 § 3, 50 U.S.C. app. § 453 (2000)
(amended 1981) (mandating that all male U.S. citizens and resident aliens between
the ages of eighteen and twenty-six are subject to Selective Service registration at a
time and manner dictated by Presidential Proclamation). One such Presidential
Proclamation imposed certain identification requirements, described the place and
time for registration, and explained the manner in which persons were to comply
with the registration process. See Proclamation No. 4771, 3 C.F.R. 82 (1981), reprinted
in 50 U.S.C. app. § 453, at 16-18 (1994) (calling for the registration of men between
the ages of eighteen and twenty-six through the authority granted to the President
under the Military Selective Service Act (MSSA)).
12. See Selective Service System, Benefits and Programs Linked to Registration, at
http://www.sss.gov/Fsbenefits.htm (revised Sept. 5, 2000) (describing a range of
federal benefits denied to those who fail to register, including student financial aid,
job training, federal employment, and additional state imposed sanctions) (on file
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In 1981, shortly after registration was reinstituted, the U.S.
13
Supreme Court heard Rostker v. Goldberg, a gender-based challenge
14
to the registration requirement. In Rostker, the Court reasoned that
judicial deference to Congress is particularly appropriate in the
15
context of military affairs. The Court also reasoned that men and
women are not similarly situated for purposes of a draft or
16
registration for a draft, and that Congress extensively considered the
questions of registering women prior to its decision to reactivate the
17
Ultimately, the Court
process of exclusively registering men.
concluded that Congress acted within its constitutional power when it
authorized the registration of men, and not women, under the
18
Military Selective Service Act (MSSA).
The ruling quieted subsequent gender-based challenges to
19
registration.
Irrespective of whether the Court’s reasoning and
conclusion in Rostker were correct, no U.S. court since has signaled a
20
retreat from these positions.
The passage of time and a mounting body of evidence indicate,
however, that today’s Selective Service does not serve the national
with author).
13. 453 U.S. 57 (1981).
14. See id. at 61 n.2 (explaining that Rostker actually grew out of a dormant
lawsuit, Rowland v. Tarr, 378 F. Supp. 766 (E.D. Pa. 1974), from the days of the
Vietnam War). The district court in Rostker revived Rowland by certifying a plaintiff
class of all men registered or subject to registration. Id. at 61-62.
15. See id. at 66 (explaining that recent decisions of the Court reinforce
deference to legislative and executive judgments in the area of military affairs).
16. See id. at 79 (observing that congressional and executive bans on women
serving in combat support a finding that women and men are not similarly situated
because the purpose of registration is to develop a pool of potential combat troops).
17. See id. at 72 (contradicting appellees’ assertion that Congress acted
“unthinkingly” in funding registration for men only).
18. See id. at 79 (finding that the exemption of women from registration is closely
related to Congress’s purpose in authorizing draft registration).
19. In the few subsequent challenges to MSSA, the Supreme Court upheld
registration enforcement legislation while assuming the validity of the underlying
registration requirement itself. See, e.g., Selective Serv. Sys. v. Minn. Pub. Interest
Research Group, 468 U.S. 841 (1984) (arguing unsuccessfully that the Department
of Defense Authorization Act of 1983 § 1113(f)(4), 50 U.S.C. app. § 462 (2000),
which requires male students between the ages of eighteen and twenty-six to register
for the draft prior to receiving federal financial aid, was a bill of attainder and a
violation of non-registrants’ Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination);
Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598 (1985) (challenging, without success, the
prosecution of a vocal opponent to draft registration for his failure to register, as a
form of selective prosecution). The Court has not heard arguments against any
aspect of draft registration since 1985.
20. The Supreme Court has not ruled on any challenges to registration since
Rostker. The only significant challenge to registration following Rostker was Detenber
v. Turnage. See 701 F.2d 233 (1st Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1203 (1983)
(rejecting an argument that peacetime registration is a deprivation of liberty without
due process of law and reinforcing the concept of judicial deference to the President
and Congress in the context of military affairs).
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21

defense purpose presumed by the Court in Rostker.
Since that
decision, conditions under which the Department of Defense (DoD)
evaluated its own personnel needs and upon which the Court
22
partially based its decision have changed drastically.
Similarly,
conditions under which the Court evaluated the need for registration
23
Despite sporadic calls for its
also are markedly different today.
resumption and numerous instances of U.S. military involvement, no
24
draft has been declared since registration resumed in 1981.
25
Registration was originally coupled with an active military draft. The
26
current registration has never served a military draft, and with each
passing year, it becomes more apparent that registration serves no
27
28
legitimate defense purpose and will not be used for conscription,
29
the compulsory enrollment of persons for military service.
This Comment proposes that the current draft registration serves
no legitimate national defense purpose. Part I details events leading
21. See infra notes 186-98 and accompanying text (discussing altered U.S. defense
strategies and priorities, which merit a reevaluation of Rostker).
22. See Edwin Dorn, Sustaining the All-Volunteer Force, in PROFESSIONAL ON THE
FRONT LINE: TWO DECADES OF THE ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE 3, 19 (J. Eric Fredland et al.
eds., 1996) (observing that the percentage of women in the All-Volunteer Force
(AVF) rose from three percent in 1973 to twelve percent in 1994); see also Mark J.
Eitelberg, The All-Volunteer Force After Twenty Years, in PROFESSIONAL ON THE FRONT
LINE: TWO DECADES OF THE ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE 66, 70-77 (J. Eric Fredland et al.
eds., 1996) (reporting that the decrease in the number of applicants to the AVF
between 1973 and 1992 was accompanied by an equally dramatic rise in the quality of
applicants). For example, in 1992, over ninety-five percent of new recruits were high
school graduates, versus fifty-two percent in 1973. Id. at 71.
23. See infra notes 300-30 and accompanying text (discussing the impossibility of
a time consuming draft contributing to the rapid mobilization of forces in times of
crisis, which renders registration in advance of a draft unnecessary).
24. See CENTER FOR DEFENSE INFORMATION, 2001-2002 MILITARY ALMANAC 50-53
(2002) [hereinafter MILITARY ALMANAC] (reporting selected U.S. military actions
after the Vietnam War, which have included actions in Lebanon, Grenada, Libya,
Panama, Somalia, the Persian Gulf, and Kosovo).
25. See Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 59-60 (1981) (asserting that registration
is inseparable from induction and thus subject to the same degree of judicial
deference); but see infra notes 339-41 and accompanying text (reviewing the historic
and current separateness of registration and induction); see also Bandow, supra note
5, at 8-9 (explaining that prior to the current registration system, registration took
place as a part of conscription at the beginning of the two world wars and continued
to operate as such until the end of the Vietnam War).
26. See Selective Service System, Induction Statistics, at http://www.sss.gov/
induct.htm (revised Dec. 21, 2001) [hereinafter Induction Statistics] (reporting that
no one has been inducted into the U.S. military through Selective Service since 1973,
prior to reinstatement of registration 1980).
27. See generally infra Part III (arguing that registration does not serve current
military needs and fails even to adequately accomplish its stated objective).
28. See infra notes 280-84 and accompanying text (summarizing the DoD position
that registration was not needed and the likelihood of a need for conscripts was
extremely remote).
29. WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 482 (Merriam-Webster
1983).
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to the current registration, traces the history of judicial decisions that
support it, and analyzes the Supreme Court’s ruling in Rostker v.
30
Goldberg. Part II discusses changes in the U.S. military which subvert
many of the Court’s assumptions in Rostker, reviews the altered state
31
of world affairs and military strategy, and examines the evolving role
of the All-Volunteer Force (AVF) and women in the military. Part III
illustrates the illegitimacy of draft registration as a component of
national defense by documenting the irrelevance of registration to
military planning, the failure of Selective Service to effectively serve a
defense interest, the reasons why the Court should not defer to
Congress regarding registration, and the political forces that have
32
maintained registration despite its failure.
This Comment
concludes that the positions asserted by the Rostker Court are
33
incompatible with current U.S. defense priorities and the liberty
interests of citizens who are subject to registration.
I.

FOUNDATIONS OF CURRENT DRAFT REGISTRATION

The current era of Selective Service registration in the United
States began in 1980, when President Carter called for the
34
resumption of draft registration in a State of the Union Address.
30. See Rostker, 453 U.S. at 65-67 (affirming the legislative action by deferring to
the broad discretionary powers of Congress to raise and regulate the armed forces).
31. See MICHAEL J. MAZARR ET AL., DESERT STORM: THE GULF WAR AND WHAT WE
LEARNED 160-63 (1993) (asserting that during the years 1989-1992 the context of U.S.
military planning shifted from the massive threat posed by the Soviet Union to
smaller regional conflicts like the Persian Gulf war, thereby demanding rapid but
limited responses coordinated with U.S. allies).
32. See Doug Bandow, Dubious Draft Registration: It is up to the Incoming Republican
Majority to Abolish the Sign-Up and Save $25 Million a Year, WASH. TIMES, Dec. 3, 1994, at
D3 (arguing that the Clinton Administration’s reasons for maintaining registration
no longer exist because the threat of war with the Soviet Union had been eliminated
and future U.S. military involvement can be supported adequately by the existing
active and reserve forces).
33. See Donald H. Rumsfeld, 2002 Department of Defense Annual Report to the
President and the Congress (Aug. 15, 2002) (outlining the projected post-September
11th transformation of national defense, including improvements in technology,
mobility, intelligence, and quality of personnel), available at http://www.
defenselink.mil/execsec/adr2002/html_files/Message.htm (last visited Feb. 1,
2003).
34. See State of the Union Address (Jan. 23, 1980) in Public Papers of the
Presidents of the United States: Jimmy Carter 1980-81 194, 198 (1981) [hereinafter
“State of the Union Address”] (announcing President Carter’s intention to send
draft registration legislation and a budget proposal to Congress, and expressing
Carter’s hope that a draft would not be needed), available at http://www.
jimmycarterlibrary.org/documents/speeches/su80jec.phtml (last modified July 21,
2001). President Gerald Ford discontinued draft registration in 1975. See
Proclamation No. 4360, 3 C.F.R. § 462 (1971-1975), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. app. § 453,
at 347 (2000) (terminating existing registration procedures and announcing that
replacement procedures would provide for periodic registration); see also Military
Selective Service Act of 1967, § 5, amended by Pub. L. No. 92-129, § 101(9)(d)-(e),
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The address focused exclusively on foreign affairs and particularly
on the Soviet Union, whose recent invasion of Afghanistan Carter
36
condemned. The resumption of registration was one of a number
37
of measures Carter called for in response to the invasion. Under the
MSSA, the President does not have the power to order the
38
Nevertheless, Carter recommended that
registration of women.
Congress amend the MSSA to extend the registration requirement to
39
both men and women. After months of often skeptical debate in
40
the House and the Senate, Congress responded by authorizing
41
funding for the registration of men only. In addition to Rostker,
several other significant but ultimately unsuccessful legal challenges
42
to the onset of registration followed. Opposition to registration was
ultimately derailed by courts, which extended longstanding judicial
43
acceptance of conscription to registration.

reprinted in 50 U.S.C. app. § 455 (2000) (authorizing the conscription of up to
270,000 persons into the armed forces through July 1, 1973); Pub. Law 92-129,
§ 101(29), 65 Stat. 87 (1971) (maintaining Selective Service as an active standby
organization even if DoD employs an AVF).
35. See Terence Smith, The World Has Changed and So Has Jimmy Carter, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 20, 1980, at E2 (reporting that in order to devote his oral address to a “global
review,” President Carter planned to issue a separate, written State of the Union
message to Congress that addressed domestic affairs).
36. See State of the Union Address, supra note 34, at 196 (characterizing the
Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan as the most serious threat to peace since
World War II).
37. See id. (calling for a number of other measures, including a U.S.-led boycott
of the 1980 Olympic games in Moscow).
38. See Military Selective Service Act of 1967 § 3, 50 U.S.C. app. § 453 (2000)
(amended 1981) (granting the President discretionary powers to draft males only).
39. See Carter Plan on Draft: 20-Year-Olds First in Lottery, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 1980, at
A17 (reporting President Carter’s formal request to Congress for funding to register
both men and women).
40. See Richard Halloran, President’s Draft Registration Plan Arouses Skepticism at
Senate Hearing, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 1980, at A12 (quoting comments from Sen. Mark
Hatfield that registration was a waste of money that would not aide national defense,
and from Sen. Harrison Schmidt that the proposal was a political ploy to distract
from more pressing military shortcomings); see also Richard Halloran, Group in House
Expresses Doubt On Draft Signup, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 1980, at A16 (reporting
opposition to registration in a House Appropriations Subcommittee, which cited
reasons ranging from the registration’s inability to enhance national defense to the
fact that women were included in Carter’s request). In response to the opposition of
the inclusion of women, the Carter Administration amended its request so that
registration of men and women would be considered separately. Id.
41. See H.R.J. Res. 521, 96th Cong., 126 CONG. REC. 14308 (1980) (enacted)
(appropriating $13 million for the registration of men in a manner to be determined
by the President).
42. See cases cited supra note 19 (noting cases challenging registrationenforcement without challenging the registration requirement itself).
43. See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968) (affirming Congress’s
power to make all laws necessary to raise and support armies, including the
establishment of registration procedures to insure the availability of conscripts).
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A. The Draft and the Courts
Prior to the current Selective Service registration, every draft
registration in U.S. history was coupled with an active system of
44
conscription. The history of federal conscription before the midtwentieth century is brief, consisting of two years during the Civil
45
46
War and two years during World War I. World War II changed
that, however, and young men were conscripted every year during the
47
period 1940-1973, except for a brief experiment with an AVF in
48
1947.
The first attempt to impose conscription in the United States took
49
place during the War of 1812. Congress defeated the proposed
plan, asserting that the federal government did not have the
50
authority to conscript. A federal draft was finally imposed during
51
52
the Civil War, and it led to the first legal challenge to draft laws. In
44. See James B. Jacobs & Dennis McNamara, Selective Service Without a Draft, in 10
ARMED FORCES & SOCIETY 361, 363 (1984) (noting that U.S. registration in both world
wars began after draft legislation was introduced).
45. See Leon Friedman, Conscription and the Constitution: The Original
Understanding, 67 MICH. L. REV. 1493, 1544-46 (1969) (noting the passage of a draft
law in March 1863 and its expiration without renewal in April 1865).
46. See Selective Service System, Induction Statistics, at http://www.sss.gov/
induct.htm (revised Dec. 21, 2001) [hereinafter Induction Statistics] (stating that the
number of U.S. military inductees during World War I was 516,212 in 1917 and
2,294,084 in 1918) (on file with author).
47. Id.
48. See GEORGE Q. FLYNN, THE DRAFT, 1940-1973, at 90-95 (1993) (documenting
the adoption of an AVF in 1947 in response to pressures from the public and
Truman’s belief that it was more important to recruit scientists and invest in
scientific methods of war than draft civilians). The AVF failed to fill the Army’s
authorized numbers and was discontinued as the danger of the Cold War became
apparent. Id. at 100-08.
49. See Michael J. Malbin, Conscription, The Constitution, and the Framers: An
Historical Analysis, 40 FORDHAM L. REV. 805, 820-21 (1972) (noting that conscription
was a component of the apparent favorite of four plans advanced by Secretary of War
James Monroe to improve the state of the army in 1814, toward the end of the War of
1812); see also RICHARD V.L. COOPER, MILITARY MANPOWER AND THE ALL-VOLUNTEER
FORCE 48 & n.8 (1977) (differentiating the plan to draft 40,000 men from modern
drafts because under the early plan all men between the ages of eighteen and fortyfive were subject to either federal military service or a tax dedicated to the pay of
those that did serve—a plan which so infuriated New England states that they refused
to raise militias for the war).
50. See Friedman, supra note 45, at 1542-43 (citing Daniel Webster’s attack on the
Monroe Plan as beyond the federal power to call upon state militia in times of
emergency and contrary to the character of the Constitution); see also DOUG BANDOW,
HUMAN RESOURCES AND DEFENSE MANPOWER 102 (1989) (noting Congress’s refusal to
authorize a draft, even in response to the capture of Washington and the burning of
the White House, and the threatened secession of several New England states over
the issue). But see Malbin, supra note 49, at 821 (asserting that Congress had the
numbers to vote on conscription but was delayed by disagreements over the length of
conscription and noting that because the war ended while Congress was in recess,
the issue was ultimately rendered moot).
51. Federal Conscription Act, ch. 75, 12 Stat. 731 (1863).
52. See Kneedler v. Lane, 45 Pa. 238 (1863)[hereinafter Kneedler II] (finding that:
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1863, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court upheld the federal draft in
53
Kneedler v. Lane. That same year, Chief Justice Roger B. Taney, of
the U.S. Supreme Court, prepared an opinion in anticipation of a
54
federal court challenge to the Federal Conscription Act, asserting
that the Act was unconstitutional because it assumed powers
55
originally granted to the states. Chief Justice Taney retired in 1864,
having never been presented with the opportunity to utilize the
56
opinion.
Although conscription during the Civil War was an
57
emotionally charged issue, in actuality, the number of drafted men
who served was relatively negligible, amounting to no more than
50,000-100,000 men out of a total Union force exceeding 2.5
58
million.
(1) Congress’s power to raise and support armies granted in Article I, Section 8 of
the Constitution includes the power to conscript; (2) as the supreme law of the land,
constitutional rights require deference by the states; and (3) because the plaintiffs
admitted that they were subject to the Federal Conscription Act and because the Act
is constitutional, the plaintiffs deserve no relief in equity and preliminary injunctions
must be vacated), available at 1863 Pa. LEXIS 152; but see Friedman, supra note 45, at
1550 (noting that the 3-2 vote in Kneedler I against the Civil War draft was,
subsequently vacated by a 3-2 vote of the reconstituted court in Kneedler II, but three
of the six judges considering the matter held that Congress did not have the power
to enforce direct conscription, thus narrowing the decision).
53. See Kneedler v. Lane, 45 Pa. 238, 272 (1863) [hereinafter Kneedler I]
(concluding the power to conscript is not granted by the Constitution and the
federal conscription plan unconstitutionally integrated the federal Army and state
militias), available at 1863 Pa. LEXIS 151. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court issued
an injunction, but the term of Chief Justice Lowrie, the author of the opinion,
subsequently expired and his replacement favored the draft. Friedman, supra note
45, at 1549-50. The recomposed court vacated the injunction without hearing
additional evidence. Id.; see also Kneedler II, 45 Pa. 238 at 295 (vacating the
preliminary injunction granted in Kneedler I).
54. Ch. 75, 12 Stat. 731.
55. See Roger B. Taney, Thoughts on the Conscription Law of the United States, in THE
MILITARY DRAFT: SELECTED READINGS ON CONSCRIPTION 207, 208-18 (Martin Anderson
& Barbara Honegger eds., 1982) (asserting that the power to draft men into armies
lies with the states rather than the federal government, and that to allow conscription
by both state and federal governments renders the constitutional distinction between
the two meaningless).
56. See Friedman, supra note 45, at 1548 (noting that no challenge to federal
conscription reached the Supreme Court by the time Chief Justice Taney retired
from the Court).
57. See JAMES W. GEARY, WE NEED MEN: THE UNION DRAFT AND THE CIVIL WAR 167
(1991) (explaining that, in addition to inciting draft-related riots in New York City,
the draft was perceived by many in the North as a system that forced poor men to
fight for the benefit of rich men).
58. See id. at 173 (calculating that 3.7% of Union troops were conscripts); see also
RUSSEL F. WEIGLEY, HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY 210 (1984) (explaining that
the federal draft system during the Civil War allowed conscripts to purchase
commutation and maintained most of the remaining conscripts as unactivated
substitutes, resulting in only 46,347 conscripts actually serving in a total force of
2,666,999 men); EUGENE CONVERSE MURDOCK, PATRIOTISM LIMITED 1862-1865: THE
CIVIL WAR DRAFT AND THE BOUNTY SYSTEM 210 (1967) (stating that of the 151,488 men
drawn for draft consideration in New York State, only 3,210 were actually drafted,
with the remainder failing to report, exempt, or permitted to purchase commutation
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World War I brought another federal draft, after a nearly fifty-year
59
hiatus, and this draft produced substantial numbers of men. This
wartime draft resulted in a number of legal challenges, which the
60
Supreme Court ultimately heard collectively.
In a landmark
decision, the Court in Selective Draft Law Cases unanimously upheld
61
the federal government’s power to conscript, a power which it
concluded stems from Congress’s constitutionally granted powers “to
62
raise and support Armies.” The Court devoted considerable time to
63
analyzing the draft as it was used in the Civil War. The Court found
support for its conclusion in the rulings of several Confederate state
64
65
courts that supported the draft, as well as in Kneedler. The Court
was apparently unaware of Chief Justice Taney’s undelivered opinion
66
finding the Civil War draft to be unconstitutional.
The Court’s
portrayal of Civil War history in Selected Draft Law Cases conveys the
false impression that considerable numbers of men were conscripted
67
and that they played a vital role in the war.

or pay for substitutes).
59. See Induction Statistics, supra note 46 (reporting a total of 2,810,296 men were
conscripted during World War I).
60. Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366 (1918).
61. See id. at 377 (concluding that the framers of the Constitution intentionally
granted Congress the power to conscript).
62. Id.; see also U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 12 (“The Congress shall have the
Power . . . [t]o raise and support Armies.”); U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 (“The
Congress shall have the Power . . . [t]o make all laws which shall be necessary and
proper for carrying into execution the foregoing Powers . . . .”).
63. See Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. at 385-89 (discussing the decision to
impose a Civil War draft and asserting that the soldiers garnered through the draft
were critical to the Union’s success).
64. Id. at 388 (citing In re Pille, 39 Ala. 459 (1864); In re Emerson, 39 Ala. 437
(1864); Ex Parte Hill, 38 Ala. 429 (1863); Parker v. Kaughman, 34 Ga. 136 (1865);
Barber v. Irwin, 34 Ga. 27 (1864); Daly & Fitzgerald v. Harris, 33 Ga. Supp. 38 (1864);
Jeffers v. Fair, 33 Ga. 347 (1862); Summons v. Miller, 40 Miss. 19 (1864); Gatlin v.
Walton, 60 N.C. 333 (1864); Ex Parte Coupland, 26 Tex. 386 (1862); Burroughs v.
Payton, 57 Va. 470 (1864)).
65. See Kneedler II, 45 Pa. 238, 295 (1863) (vacating the preliminary injunction
granted in Kneedler I). In Selective Draft Law Cases, the U.S. Supreme Court cites
Kneedler II without mentioning that the Pennsylvania Court’s original ruling did not
support the draft. See Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. at 388 (citing only the Kneedler
II decision vacating the preliminary injunctions granted to the plaintiffs and
declaring the draft unconstitutional). What was in essence a tie vote at the state
court level became a major foundational element of a unanimous Supreme Court
vote affirming federal conscription powers fifty-two years later. Friedman, supra note
45, at 1544.
66. Taney, supra note 55, at 218. See Friedman, supra note 45, at 1494-95, 1546
(arguing that the Supreme Court based its decision in the Selective Draft Law Cases on
superficial evidence and disregarded substantial historical findings to the contrary,
including Taney’s opinion).
67. See Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. at 387 (stating that 250,000 men were
conscripted by the end of 1864). But see WEIGLEY, supra note 58, at 210 (placing the
total number of conscripts who actually served at 46,347).
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The ruling in Selective Draft Law Cases, though consistently followed
68
by the Supreme Court, has been criticized by a wide range of legal
69
The decision was announced against a
scholars and historians.
polarized national backdrop, pitting patriotism and nationalism
70
against a significant anti-war movement.
Some modern
commentators argue that, despite this ruling, Congress simply does
71
not have the constitutional authority to institute a nationwide draft.
Irrespective of academic and historical disagreement, Selective Draft
Law Cases is the authority upon which the Rostker ruling and the
current system of draft registration rest.

68. See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968) (citing Selective Draft
Law Cases for the proposition that it is “beyond question” that Congress has the
power to conscript); Billings v. Truesdell, 321 U.S. 542, 556 (1944) (citing Selective
Draft Law Cases and affirming congressional power to raise armies by both enlistment
and conscription).
69. See, e.g., David M. Stigler, Conscription and Constitutional Law, in 2 STUDIES
PREPARED FOR THE PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION ON ALL-VOLUNTEER ARMED FORCE III-6-1,
2-3 (G.P.O. 1970) (faulting the Court’s decision in Selective Draft Law Cases for
conceding to a nationwide pro-war fervor and arguing that the decision should be
read narrowly to apply to only a war-time draft); Friedman, supra note 45, at 1551
(criticizing the Selective Draft Law Cases’ constitutional analysis for focusing on the
Thirteenth Amendment’s prohibition of involuntary servitude while ignoring the
early history of the military clauses); JOHN WHITCLAY CHAMBERS II, TO RAISE AN ARMY:
THE DRAFT COMES TO MODERN AMERICA 221 (Free Press 1987) (characterizing the
decision more as a product of political forces in the United States at that time and
less a product of legal and historical analysis). But see LOREN P. BETH, THE
DEVELOPMENT OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 1877-1917, at 163-64 (Harper 1971)
(arguing that the ruling is supported by case law establishing the principle that
national emergencies justify extraordinary measures).
70. See Stigler, supra note 69, at III-6-2-3 (describing the decision as being heavily
influenced by hostility to the anti-war movement). The government went to great
lengths to suppress opposition to the war. See Friedman, supra note 45, at 1550-51
(noting that this time period witnessed significant erosion of civil liberties and those
who spoke out against the war or the draft were jailed under the Espionage Act).
71. See Friedman, supra note 45, at 1519 (noting that the question of federal
conscription was not discussed at the Constitutional Convention and arguing that the
framers of the Constitution were unlikely to believe that Congress had the power to
conscript because no other country had those powers at the time); Charles A.
Lofgren, Compulsory Military Service Under the Constitution: The Original Understanding,
in “GOVERNMENT FROM REFLECTION AND CHOICE”: CONSTITUTIONAL ESSAYS ON WAR,
FOREIGN RELATIONS, AND FEDERALISM 68-69 (Oxford 1986) (arguing the
understanding of the Constitution at the time of its enactment was that the country
would be defended by a state militia system, which had the power to conscript in
time of emergency, and a smaller federal standing army that would be composed of
non-conscripted professionals); Stigler, supra note 69, at III-6-1 (arguing that “there
is no clear-cut historical justification for considering any conscription to be
mandated or even allowed by the language of the Constitution”). But see Malbin,
supra note 49, at 811 (suggesting that while the only mention of conscription at the
Constitutional Convention was a single negative comment by Edmund Randolph, the
failure of the Convention to explicitly reject federal conscription following this
comment “constitutes an implicit acceptance” of federal draft powers).
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B. The Rostker v. Goldberg Standards
The origins of Rostker v. Goldberg
72
Rostker v. Goldberg stemmed from a Vietnam-era class action,
73
Rowland v. Tarr, which sought relief from enforcement of draft
74
registration on a variety of grounds, including equal protection. In
75
Rowland, the plaintiffs requested a three-judge panel, which was
required to issue an injunction against enforcement of a federal
76
Instead, a single judge found that the case involved a
statute.
political question and granted defendants’ motion to dismiss for non77
justiciability.
On appeal, all the original counts were dismissed
78
The case was remanded for
except the equal protection claim.
79
determination of the plaintiffs’ standing by a three-judge panel. On
remand, the district court ruled that the plaintiffs had standing
80
because the constitutionality of the MSSA was a justiciable issue.
After this victory, the case saw no activity for five years.
In 1979, the attempted dismissal of the case for inactivity brought it
81
82
back to life.
The case was relitigated as Goldberg v. Rostker,
reflecting the addition of new lead party Robert Goldberg, and the
83
incoming director of Selective Service, Bernard Rostker. At trial, a
three-judge panel held that the complete exclusion of women from
draft registration was not substantially related to an important

1.

72. 453 U.S. 57 (1981).
73. 341 F. Supp. 339, 340 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
74. The court did not address any of the plaintiffs’ claims but instead focused
only on the jurisdiction issue. Id.
75. See Rowland, 341 F. Supp. at 340 (noting that the court does not have clear
guidelines regarding when to grant the three-judge hearing).
76. 28 U.S.C. § 2282 (repealed 1976) (requiring a panel of three judges to issue
an injunction of a federal statute on constitutional grounds).
77. See Rowland, 341 F. Supp. at 342-43 (finding that the determination that the
case involved a political question was buttressed by precedent upholding Congress’s
power to conscript).
78. See Rowland v. Tarr, 480 F.2d 545, 546 (3d Cir. 1973) (finding that the
plaintiffs’ other claims were foreclosed by previous Supreme Court decisions or were
non-justiciable because of mootness stemming from the end of the Vietnam War).
79. Id. at 547.
80. See Rowland v. Tarr, 378 F. Supp. 766, 771-72 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (ruling that
plaintiffs’ alleged harm as a result of the Act was a matter of objective fact and
rejecting the defendants’ motion to dismiss).
81. See Goldberg v. Tarr, 510 F. Supp. 292, 294 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (discussing how
the case was scheduled to be dismissed for inactivity in accordance with a local rule).
82. 509 F. Supp. 586 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
83. See Linda K. Kerber, A Constitutional Right to be Treated Like . . . Ladies: Women,
Civic Obligation, and Military Service, 1993 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 95, 101-102
(1993) (noting that the original plaintiffs dropped out of the case because they
began the litigation as an anti-war case and the remaining equal protection claim
implied that the plaintiffs agreed with draft—if only it were also applied to women).
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84

government interest. The court found that the MSSA violated the
Fifth Amendment of the Constitution and it permanently enjoined
the government from requiring class members to register for the
85
draft under the MSSA.
U.S. Supreme Court Justice William Brennan, sitting as Circuit
86
Justice, suspended this court order in response to Rostker’s in87
chambers stay application.
Justice Brennan was persuaded that
national security could be endangered by enforcement of the district
88
court’s injunction. The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction,
89
and the case was brought directly to the Court. The Rostker case
90
It ultimately reached the
began as an anti-war/anti-draft case.
Supreme Court as solely an equal protection case, at a time when the
91
United States was not fighting a war and had no active draft.
The Court’s analysis in Rostker
The Supreme Court’s decision in Rostker upheld registration as it
92
was then and essentially still is today. In Rostker, the only challenge
2.

84. See Goldberg, 509 F. Supp. at 605 (finding the MSSA violated equal protection
because it failed intermediate scrutiny).
85. See id. (finding there was no convincing reason presented to justify the
exclusion of women from registration).
86. See 28 U.S.C. § 42 (2000) (giving the Supreme Court the power to assign its
Justices to each of the federal circuits); see also Frank Felleman & John C. Wright,
Note, The Powers of the Supreme Justice Acting in an Individual Capacity, 112 U. PA. L.
REV. 981, 984-85 (1964) (describing the work of a circuit justice). A circuit justice
received all applications from the assigned circuit, including applications for stays,
bail, and time extensions. Id. at 985.
87. See Rostker v. Goldberg, 448 U.S. 1306, 1308 (1980) (Brennan, J., Circuit
Justice, 3d Cir.) (explaining that a four-part showing must be made to justify the
extraordinary measure of a single Circuit Justice staying the enforcement of a district
court order: (1) there must be a “reasonable probability” that the Supreme Court
will grant certiorari; (2) there must be a “fair probability” that the Court will overturn
the lower court order; (3) the applicant must demonstrate irreparable harm from
enforcement of the court order; and (4) the balance of the equities must favor the
applicant).
88. Id. at 1309 (noting that absent a suspension, the lower court’s injunction of
draft registration would remain in effect even if there was a national crisis).
89. Rostker v. Goldberg, 449 U.S. 1009, 1009 (1980) (denying that motion of
Stacey Acker et al. for leave to intervene and noting probable jurisdiction).
90. See Kerber, supra note 83, at 100-01 (noting that although the original
plaintiffs included an equal protection claim, they really saw the case as part of the
anti-war movement).
91. See Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 61-62 (1981) (characterizing the case in
its current form as a peacetime challenge to registration transformed from its
beginnings as a challenge brought at the height of the Vietnam war).
92. See id. at 83 (finding registration of men only does not violate the
constitution); Proclamation No. 4771, 3 C.F.R. 82 (1981), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. app.
§ 453, at 16-18 (1994) (calling for a gradual registration first of those born in 1960,
then in 1961, and finally in 1962, with those born in 1963 and subsequent years
registering upon their eighteenth birthday). The current requirement calls for all
male citizens or permanent resident aliens to register within thirty days of their
eighteenth birthday.
Selective Service System, When to Register, at

KAMENS.PRINTER.DOC

716

5/14/2003 3:09 PM

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52:703
93

to draft registration considered by the Supreme Court, the plaintiffs
argued that requiring only men to register for the draft violated the
94
Fifth Amendment. The Court reviewed recommendations made by
the DoD and the Carter Administration that women be included in
95
draft registration, but ultimately found that Congress was justified in
96
rejecting these suggestions.
The majority opinion characterized support for registering women
as being motivated by an interest in equality, rather than by military
97
necessity, and found that Congress was justified in focusing solely on
98
military needs. The Court gave considerable weight to Congress’s
99
own analysis of whether to register and draft women, and found that
Congress adequately considered equal protection issues when
100
deciding to fund the registration of men only.
The Court
concluded that Congress was within its power in furthering a
101
legitimate military interest to impose registration on men only.
In finding that registration was a violation of the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment, the district court distinguished
inclusion of women in draft registration from the discriminate
102
military induction of women.
The Supreme Court, however,
http://www.sss.gov/when.htm (revised July 9, 2002) (on file with author).
93. In the only post-Rostker challenge of registration, the First Circuit Court of
Appeals upheld a lower court ruling affirming draft registration. See Detenber v.
Turnage, 701 F.2d 233, 234-35 (1st Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1203 (1983)
(challenging draft registration as due process violation). Opposition to the draft is
not a recent phenomenon. It was widespread during the Civil War, World War I, and
the Vietnam War. See CHAMBERS, supra note 69, at 54-55 (noting that conscription
during the Civil War produced draft riots and widespread failure to register); FLYNN,
supra note 48, at 174-76 (Kansas Univ. Press 1993) (describing draft resistance during
the Vietnam War such as burning draft cards, protests, and the destruction of
records at local recruiting boards); Friedman, supra note 45, at 1550-51 (describing
the breadth of opposition to the draft in World War I, which included ministers,
socialists, and mid-western farmers).
94. See Rostker, 453 U.S. at 59 (articulating the issue of the case as whether MSSA
regulations authorizing the President to require only males to register violates the
Fifth Amendment).
95. See id. at 72 (noting that Congress held extensive hearings on the question of
requiring women to register).
96. See id. at 74 (finding that Congress considered the issue carefully and made
its intent clear).
97. Id. at 79-80.
98. See id. at 80-81 (noting that even those military experts who supported the
registration of women were opposed to actually drafting women because they could
not be used in combat).
99. Id. at 72.
100. See id. at 77 (finding that the prohibition of women from combat was a
legitimate basis on which to decide not to require women to register for the draft).
101. Id. at 83.
102. Goldberg v. Rostker, 509 F. Supp. 586, 604-05 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (asserting that
registration of women would increase “military flexibility” and induction calls of
women could be made according to military need, with no requirement that men
and women be drafted in equal numbers).
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declined to view the federal power to require registration and the
103
The Court cited
federal power to conscript as separate entities.
with approval congressional testimony asserting that the registration
104
is intended to draft and mobilize troops for combat. It added that
women are barred from combat by statute, rules, and practice, and
105
Because of the
thus could not be mobilized by such a draft.
restrictions against women in combat, the Court concluded that
women are not similarly situated for the purposes of a draft or
106
registration.
The Constitution, the Court held, is therefore not
107
offended by such an exclusion.
After reaching the conclusion that women are excluded from
combat, the Court examined the potential use of a draft, which would
108
induct women into non-combat roles. Based on Senate testimony,
the Court found that only a small number of women might be
109
It
deployed into non-combat roles in a national emergency.
concluded that this small number would place a burden on the
110
training facilities and produce no additional combat troops.
The Court’s consideration of the role of women in the military
appears uninformed by the increased presence of women in the
111
military at that time.
The Court quoted the testimony of General
103. See Rostker, 453 U.S. at 75 (citing congressional testimony to support the
Court’s position that “induction is interlocked with registration” under the MSSA).
104. See id. at 76 (emphasizing the need to exercise judicial deference to
Congress’s clear determination that, in the instance of a draft, there would be a need
for combat troops).
105. See id. at 76-77 (enumerating the statutory and policy grounds for excluding
women from combat).
106. See id. at 78 (reasoning that differential treatment of individuals in a draft
based on race or religion can be distinguished from differential treatment of men
and women in a draft because male members of different races or religions are
“similarly situated” with regards to combat, while women and men, because of
combat restrictions placed on women, are “simply not similarly situated” for purposes
of a draft or registration).
107. See id. at 78-79 (concluding that because Congress has determined that the
purpose of registration is to create a pool of combat troops, and because Congress
and the Executive have determined that women should not serve in combat: (1) the
exemption of women from combat is closely related to Congress’s purpose in
authorizing registration; and (2) men and women are simply not similarly situated
with regard to the draft, so there is no violation of the constitutional requirement
that Congress treat similarly situated persons similarly).
108. See Rostker, 453 U.S. at 81 (discussing congressional testimony contemplating
that, in the event of a draft of 650,000, the military could absorb 80,000 female
inductees to fill non-combat positions, enabling men to assume combat roles).
109. See id. (deferring to findings of the Senate Armed Services Committee, which
rejected the suggestion that all women be registered, but only a “handful” be
indicated in an emergency as “confused” and “unsatisfactory” (quoting S. Rep. No.
96-826, at 158 (1980))).
110. See id. (citing congressional testimony that “training would be needlessly
burdened by women recruits who could not be used in combat” (quoting S. REP. NO.
96-226, at 9 (1979))).
111. See id. at 90-92 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (contrasting congressional testimony
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Bernard Rogers before a Senate hearing on women and registration,
who asserted that all members of the military, regardless of position,
may at some point during an emergency have to shoulder a weapon
112
and fight.
Women in the United States military are prohibited
113
The General, and by extension the
from engaging in combat.
Court, seemed to say that women have no place in the military
because all personnel must be counted on to engage in combat and
114
women cannot do so by law.
This argument for excluding women from a potential draft is at
odds with the view of the Court, which characterized conscription as
the source for a stream of ground troops separate from personnel
115
performing routine functions of the military. During a war, if that
stream is insufficiently maintained because women are excluded from
116
a draft, male non-ground troops must be called into action.
This

acknowledging and appreciating the expanded role of women in the military with
the Court’s exclusive focus on women in combat). The Court’s hypothetical ratio of
women inductees, at approximately twelve percent, is presented with no
acknowledgement of the actual numbers of women in the military at the time of the
Rostker decision. Id. at 81. See Martin Binkin & Mark Eitelberg, Women and Minorities
in the All-Volunteer Force, in THE ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE AFTER A DECADE: RETROSPECT
AND PROSPECT 73, 83 (William Bowman et al. eds., 1986) (placing the ratio of women
to total military personnel in 1981 at 8.9%). The Supreme Court ruling relied on
congressional testimony orchestrated by a Congress that itself appeared uninformed
as to the actual role of women in the military. Compare Rostker, 453 U.S. at 75 (1981)
(citing comments by Sen. Warner equating registration with a draft, which would
necessarily exclude women), with JEANNE HOLM, WOMEN IN THE MILITARY: AN
UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 445 (rev. ed., 1992) (citing Senator John Warner’s surprised
observation that during preparations for B-52 strikes launched from England during
the Persian Gulf War, “you couldn’t distinguish the men from the women . . . . The
women were loading and fusing the 500 pound bombs the same as the men.”).
112. See Rostker, 453 U.S. at 82 n.17 (stating that “in an emergency during war, the
Army has often had to reach back into the support base, into the supporting
elements in the operating base, and pull forward soldiers to fill the ranks in an
emergency; that is, to hand them a rifle or give them a tanker suit and put them in
the front ranks”).
113. See Lorry Fenner, Either You Need These Women or You Don’t, in WOMEN IN THE
MILITARY 5, 15, 30 n.18 (Rita James Simon, ed., 2001) (observing that Navy and Air
Force women were excluded from combat by law, but Army service policy alone
excluded women from combat, and that physical standards could effectively bar
women where legislation did not). See also infra notes 252-53 and accompanying text
(discussing the former combat exclusion rule, known as the “Risk Rule,” which
banned female U.S. military personnel from proximity to combat, and its
replacement in 1994 with a rule that only prohibits such personnel from direct
engagement in ground combat).
114. See Rostker, 453 U.S. at 82 (reciting General Rogers’s testimony to support its
position that Congress acted within the permissible exercise of its constitutional
powers in excluding women from the draft).
115. Id. at 76 (maintaining the primary purpose of the draft is to supply combat
troops and thus must consist solely of combat trained men).
116. See id. at 98 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing Senate testimony from Assistant
Secretary of Defense Robert Pirie that the drafting of women for non-combat
positions would allow a greater deployment of men into combat positions).
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would potentially leave non-combat positions unfilled.
Support
personnel have long considerably outnumbered combat troops, as
evidenced by the vast number of military jobs currently open to
118
women despite the ban on women in ground combat.
Yet the
Court, partially basing its decision on exceptional circumstances
119
recounted by Senator Warner, endorsed a system under which
women might conceivably not even be drafted into a support role
120
until all the men are killed.
In his dissent, Justice White observed that DoD testimony suggested
121
that women, in fact, would be needed should there be a draft. He
argued that the probability of women being drafted in unequal
numbers did not justify excluding them from registration in
122
furtherance of administrative convenience.
Justice White also
characterized the position of both the Court’s majority and that of
Congress as having ignored “reality,” “common sense,” and
“experience” by ignoring the increasing role that women have played
123
in recent wars.

117. See id. at 100 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing Senate testimony from Assistant
Secretary of Defense Richard Danzig that in a war-time in which 650,000 were
drafted, approximately 80,000 would be drafted to fill non-combat positions).
118. See infra notes 253-55 and accompanying text (chronicling a change in
restrictions against women serving in many positions in the military, which has
opened up ninety percent of military jobs to women); see also MICHAEL CLODFELTER,
VIETNAM IN MILITARY STATISTICS: A HISTORY OF THE INDOCHINA WARS, 1772-1991, at 238
(1995) (placing the ratio of U.S. ground troops to total number of military personnel
in Vietnam at approximately twelve percent).
119. See Rostker, 453 U.S. at 83 (citing a particular episode during the Battle of the
Bulge where General Patton had to reach back into the military support base and
pull forward soldiers to fill ranks in an emergency, to support General Rogers’s
conclusion that women should be excluded from the draft because combat eligibility
is a prerequisite for all positions needing to be filled in a draft).
120. See id. at 83 (White, J., dissenting) (voicing his conclusion that the majority’s
opinion leaves no room for women in the military).
121. See id. at 84 (citing military testimony asserting that in a major military
mobilization, 80,000 women could be deployed in support roles during the first six
months).
122. Id. at 85; see also id. at 95 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (asserting that “additional
cost and administrative inconvenience” are not sufficient arguments to support
gender discrimination); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 198 (1976) (noting that the
relevant Supreme Court jurisprudence rejects the notion of evoking administrative
ease and convenience as justification for gender-based classifications); Frontiero v.
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 690-691 (1973) (asserting that administrative convenience
cannot alone justify differing treatment according to gender within the armed
services); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971) (holding that classification based
upon gender to eliminate an entire class from consideration and thus the workload
of probate courts is a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment).
123. Rostker, 453 U.S. at 83.
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The deference granted to Congress by the Rostker Court
The Rostker Court accepted the gender-based classification without
imposing a burden on the government to prove that the classification
124
survived the heightened scrutiny traditionally called for.
Instead,
the Court shifted this burden to the plaintiff out of deference to
125
It is not clear why the majority allocated the burden of
Congress.
proof in this way, though it was strongly questioned in Justice
126
Marshall’s dissent.
The Court should have applied heightened scrutiny with the
burden placed fully on the government to prove the close and
substantial relationship between the discriminatory means employed
127
and the asserted governmental objective, as has been traditionally
128
done where gender classification is at issue.
The Court, however,
readily accepted evidence that supported the assertion that women
129
and men were not similarly situated with regard to combat. Despite
accepting some evidence that women could be drafted into non130
combat positions, the Court also accepted evidence which implied
131
that everyone in the military should be counted on for combat.
3.

124. Id. at 64-72; see also Craig, 429 U.S. at 204 (establishing that the burden of
proof that a gender classification is substantially related to an important government
interest rests upon the offending party); Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 689 (asserting that the
government failed to prove that its discriminatory means served its stated end,
though the Court had already ruled that end to be impermissibly based on
administrative convenience).
125. Rostker, 453 U.S. at 68-72 (emphasizing that judicial deference to
congressional exercise of authority is “at its apogee” when legislative action involving
Congress’ ability to raise and support armies and to regulate military matters is
challenged).
126. See id. at 89 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (asserting that the Court does not
abdicate its ultimate responsibility to decide constitutional questions simply because
it is required to accord deference to congressional judgements in the area of military
affairs).
127. See id. at 67 (stating that even in military affairs, Congress is subject to Due
Process requirements, yet subsequently extending deference to congressional
judgment).
128. See Craig, 429 U.S. at 197 (establishing the heightened scrutiny standard for
gender classifications, requiring that they be substantially related to serving an
important government objective); see also United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533
(1996); Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455, 459-460 (1981); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268,
278 (1979).
129. See Rostker, 453 U.S. at 76-77 (embracing Senate testimony that the purpose of
a draft in war is to raise combat troops, and women are excluded from combat). But
see CLODFELTER, supra note 118, at 238 (reporting that in 1968, 88% of the 543,000
American troops deployed to Vietnam were support or administrative personnel,
creating an image of many non-combat jobs available to women in a war).
130. See Rostker, 453 U.S. at 81 (admitting the possibility that some women could
be drafted into non-combat positions but accepting Congress’s rationalization that
this would cause excessive administrative burden).
131. See supra notes 112-14 and accompanying text (citing extraordinary
circumstances which may require that even support personnel enter combat).
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The Court had no trouble connecting a draft of combat troops with a
132
prohibition against women in combat, and might easily have found
that the government could overcome the heightened burden of
133
proof.
Justice White’s observation that Congress and the Court had
ignored transformations in the military illustrates this Comment’s
134
thesis, that modern military needs do not justify draft registration.
The Court asserted that registration is part of “a united and
continuous process designed to raise an army speedily and
135
efficiently.” Citing Senate testimony, the Court founds registration
clearly linked to the rapid delivery of inductees and the rapid
136
mobilization of troops. The Court did not specifically define what
it meant by rapidity of induction and mobilization, either in its
opinion or in its citation to the Senate testimony. Rather, it focused
137
on why a draft would be needed, and it deferred to congressional
138
judgment on the question.
The meaning of rapid and efficient
deployment that the Court appeared to employ does not, however,
correspond with the actual deployment time asserted by Selective
139
Service, and the efficiency with which such a deployment could
140
serve the needs of a vastly transformed U.S. military.

132. See supra note 115 and accompanying text (defining a draft as a mechanism
for raising combat troops).
133. See Memorandum from Secretary of Defense Les Aspin to the Secretaries of
the Army, Navy, and Air Force, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the
Assistant Secretaries of Defense for Personnel and Readiness and for Reserve Affairs
(Jan. 13, 1994) [hereinafter Aspin] (noting the current rule regarding deployment
of women in the military, which still bans them from ground combat), at
http://www.chinfo.navy.mil/navpalib/people/women/memo0113.txt.
134. See Rostker, 453 U.S. at 83 (illustrating the Court’s inattention to the
substantial contribution of women volunteers in recent wars).
135. Id. at 75 (quoting Falbo v. United States, 320 U.S. 549, 553 (1944)).
136. See id. (holding that “[a]n ability to mobilize rapidly is essential to the
preservation of our national security . . . . A functioning registration system is a vital
part of any mobilization plan”).
137. See id. at 76 (citing Senate testimony concluding that a draft was intended to
produce combat troops, without reference to how rapidly they would be supplied).
138. Id.
139. See Selective Service System, Sequence of Events, at http://www.sss.gov/seq.htm
(revised Apr. 22, 1999) [hereinafter Sequence of Events] (stating that Selective Service
is required to deliver the first inductee to training camp within 193 days of the
declaration of a draft) (on file with author).
140. See Office of the Secretary of Defense, Report to the President and Congress: A
Review of the Continued Requirement for Draft Registration at 12 (Dec. 1993) [hereinafter
Review] (concluding that the military would be unable to “absorb a flood of
inductees” in the event of a rapid and limited mobilization of the kind envisioned by
military planners).
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II. THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE MODERN U.S. MILITARY
The contemporary armed forces of the United States are not the
armed forces that existed at the time of the Rostker decision. World
events, most notably the breakup of the Soviet Union and the
transformation of several Soviet satellite nations into U.S. allies or
141
neutral countries, have dramatically altered U.S. military personnel
142
The Persian Gulf War and U.S. military actions in
planning.
Panama, Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo, and elsewhere demonstrate both
143
superior U.S. weapons technology and an evolving approach to
conflict that seeks to minimize direct and/or protracted involvement,
144
The All Volunteer Force
and protects U.S. military personnel.
(AVF), which began in 1973 and was heavily criticized throughout
that decade, has significantly improved its performance and image
145
since the late 1970s and early 1980s.
Since its introduction, the
character and makeup of military personnel have evolved along with
141. See, e.g., John Yoo, Politics as Law?: The Anti-ballistic Missile Treaty, The
Separation of Powers, and Treaty Interpretation, 89 CAL. L. REV. 851, 856 (2001)
(discussing how “the Soviet Union gradually allowed its satellite nations to disavow
communism [and ultimately] broke itself into fifteen independent states”). See also
András Balogh, The Atlantic Dimensions of Central European Security, in THE FUTURE OF
NATO: ENLARGEMENT, RUSSIA, AND EUROPEAN SECURITY 186, 188 (Charles-Philippe
David & Jacques Lévesque eds., 1999) (noting the reduced influence Russia wields
over former Soviet states). Western Soviet peoples such as the Poles, Czechs, and
Hungarians have historically been regarded more as part of Western Europe, and
seek stability and security within that renewed association. Id. at 186-187.
142. Compare NOEL E. FIRTH & JAMES H. NOREN, SOVIET DEFENSE SPENDING: A
HISTORY OF CIA ESTIMATES, 1950-1990, at 210-11 (1998) (reporting revised estimates
that place Soviet armed forces personnel strength at just over 5,000,000 in 1988),
with MILITARY ALMANAC, supra note 24, at 47 (reporting current Russian active troop
strength at just over one million). See also Mazarr, supra note 31 (discussing the
impact that the decline of Soviet military power—once the primary focus of the U.S.
military—had on U.S. defense planning).
143. See MILITARY ALMANAC, supra note 24, at 11 (noting the vastly superior
position held by the United States over its potential enemies in virtually every
technologically related area of its military forces).
144. See id. at 9-10 (describing and analyzing the development of the post-Cold
War military’s focus on rapid and limited deployment, and the tension between the
need for troop presence and the desire to minimize casualties). See also id. at 50-53
(reporting a total of 824 members of the U.S. armed forces killed in action since the
United States withdrew from Vietnam).
145. See Eitelberg, supra note 22, at 67-69 (describing the initial failure of the AVF
to attract quality recruits, eventually overcome by increased compensation and the
military’s increasingly sophisticated approach both to recruiting and to maintaining
an environment suited to a volunteer force). While many reasons were given as to
why recruitment surged, Eitelberg attributes the turnaround to “the fact that the
armed services eventually became more experienced and more adept—along with
Congress and manpower research and development complex—at operating an allvolunteer environment.” Id. at 68. The recruiting improvement was so dramatic that
studies commissioned in the early 1980s to examine AVF shortcomings were obsolete
on completion. Id.
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146

military technology and strategy.
The emphasis in the AVF is on
attracting and retaining talented people to fill increasingly
147
The
specialized roles in a smaller and more efficient military.
emphasis of today’s U.S. military spending is on superior weaponry
148
operated by a qualified professional force.
A. Technology, Strategy, and Modern Warfare
The Persian Gulf War ushered in a new era of technology-centered
warfare, showcasing precision-guided munitions (“smart” bombs),
149
stealth (radar evasion) technology, and other advances.
President
George H. W. Bush hailed these advances as demonstrating “a
150
revolution in warfare.”
This weaponry garnered a great deal of
151
media attention, but was actually atypical of the type of bombs
152
primarily used by the United States during the Gulf War.
The
146. See id. at 70-82 (charting the improved quality and aptitude of AVF recruits
and a greater than five-fold increase in the percentage of personnel that are women,
from 1973-1992).
147. Gordon R. Sullivan, The All-Volunteer Force After Twenty Years, in PROFESSIONALS
ON THE FRONT LINE: TWO DECADES OF THE ALL-VOLUNTEER ARMY 28, 31 (J. Eric
Fredland et al. eds., 1996). At the time of this writing, Sullivan was Chief of Staff of
the U.S. Army. About the Editors and Contributors, PROFESSIONALS ON THE FRONT LINE:
TWO DECADES OF THE ALL-VOLUNTEER ARMY 325 (J. Eric Fredland et al. eds., 1996).
148. See MILITARY ALMANAC, supra note 24, at 9-10 (observing that current defense
initiatives emphasize technologically advanced weapons and mobilization capabilities
while expressing satisfaction with standing personnel). See also William Niskanen,
More Defense Spending for Smaller Forces: What Hath DoD Wrought? POL’Y ANALYSIS No.
110, at 1 (July 29, 1988) (noting that in 1988, U.S. military spending adjusted for
inflation was twenty percent higher than it was during the peak of the Vietnam war in
1968, despite fielding a significantly smaller armed force), available at
http://www.cato.org/ pubs/pas/pa110es.html.
149. See MAZARR, supra note 31, at 97-101 (reviewing new weapons technology and
characterizing it as the culmination of several decades of developments in war
technology and assertions by military analysts that the art of war would soon be
revolutionized).
150. Remarks at the United States Air Force Academy Commencement Ceremony
in Colorado Springs, Colorado (May 29, 1991), Public Papers of the Presidents of the
United States: George Bush 1991 575, 576 (1992) (emphasizing lessons learned in
the Persian Gulf War, including “the value of our power [and] . . . the value of
stealth”), available at http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/papers/1991/91052900.html (last
visited Sept. 10, 2002).
151. See Hit Smarter, Not Harder? Gulf War Strikes Marked a Sea Change in Air Tactics,
at http://www/cnn.com/SPECIALS/2001/gulf.war/legacy/airstrikes (last visited
Feb. 2, 2003) (discussing frequently broadcast videotape shot from the nose of a
smart bomb, showing the bomb precisely striking an elevator shaft at the Iraqi Air
Force communications building in Baghdad, and displaying a still from the footage)
(on file with author).
152. See Gen. Buster C. Glosson, Impact Of Precision Weapons On Air Combat
Operations, AIRPOWER J. (Summer 1993), at http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/
airchronicles/apj/glosson.html (asserting that while inflicting nearly seventy-five
percent of the damage, smart weapons actually only accounted for less than ten
percent of the total number of bombs dropped by the United States in the Persian
Gulf War) (on file with author). See also MIDDLE EAST WATCH, NEEDLESS DEATHS IN
THE GULF WAR: CIVILIAN CASUALTIES DURING THE AIR CAMPAIGN AND VIOLATIONS OF THE
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153

coalition forces in the Persian Gulf War, particularly the United
States, illustrated how modern weapons technology could not only
154
defeat an enemy, but could greatly reduce casualties to personnel.
While these advances in warfare technology were undeniably
dramatic leaps forward, they also were part of an ongoing evolution
155
among industrialized nations toward weapon-centered warfare.
Until recently, the history of warfare was illustrated primarily with the
156
images of army-to-army confrontations, a type of warfare that results
157
Modern military
in tremendous loss of human life to both sides.
strategy, however, has evolved such that large army-to-army
158
confrontations are no longer the focus of U.S. defense strategy,
thereby extending it a great advantage through its emphasis on
159
superior weapons technology.
The Persian Gulf War was a
watershed event for this evolution of military strategy that dates back
160
to the 1950s and before.
LAWS OF WAR 114 (1991) [hereinafter MIDDLE EAST WATCH] (reporting the post-war
disclosure that precision guided bombs accounted for only 8.8% of the more than
84,000 tons of bombs dropped during the war).
153. See Steven R. Bowman, Persian Gulf War: Summary of U.S. and Non-U.S. Forces,
CRS REPORT TO CONGRESS, Feb. 11, 1991, at i-ii (calculating the initial U.S. strike
force personnel at over 500,000, in addition to well over 200,000 personnel
committed from the countries of Afghanistan, Argentina, Australia, Bahrain,
Bangladesh, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Egypt, France,
Germany, Greece, Honduras, Hungary, Italy, Kuwait, Morocco, Netherlands, Niger,
Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, South
Korea, Spain, Syria, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, and the United Kingdom).
154. See Gulf War Facts: The Coalition, at http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/2001/
gulf.war/facts/gulfwar/ (last visited Aug. 2, 2002) (noting that the combined
coalition suffered 358 casualties, the U.S. forces suffered 293 of these deaths—145 of
which were classified as non-battle related) (on file with author). Figures on Iraqi
casualties vary, but the minimum is thought to be approximately 100,000. Id. But cf.
MAZARR, supra note 31, at 86 (describing pre-war estimates of allied casualties
numbering between 8,000 and 16,000 and Iraqi casualties numbering 60,000).
155. See FLYNN, supra note 48, at 259 (citing the examples of the massive German
air assaults at the beginning of World War II and the American use of the atomic
bomb at the war’s conclusion to illustrate the conquest of technology over traditional
warfare).
156. See id. (characterizing confrontations between mass formations of troops as
the traditional style of war through World War II).
157. See THE WORLD ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FACTS 209 (2001) (indicating that the
wars in which the United States suffered the greatest number of deaths were the Civil
War (498,333), World War I (116,708), and World War II (407,316)).
158. See MAZARR, supra note 31, at 98 (characterizing the large armies that had
been used in past wars as slow moving and vulnerable to attacks by smart weapons
and mobile ground forces). See also id. at 125-157 (describing the allied bombing
campaign, which inflicted the bulk of the damage to Iraqi forces in the Persian Gulf
War prior to actual army-to-army confrontation, and the subsequent confrontation
between Iraqi ground forces and highly mobile allied ground units that focused on
hit-and-run strikes rather than protracted engagements).
159. See id. (discussing the bombing campaign and mobile allied attack against the
Iraqi army in the Persian Gulf War, which resulted in a four-day ground campaign
that culminated in an allied victory with few allied casualties).
160. See FLYNN, supra note 48, at 259 (tracing the earliest predictions that mass
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In 1954, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles introduced the “New
161
Look” policy of defense strategy, which emphasized the threat of
massive nuclear retaliation as a defensive strategy of deterrence
162
against the Soviet Union.
Massive mobilization of men for
protracted campaigns was not a component of this strategy, which
163
instead emphasized rapid retaliation by the standing forces.
The first major U.S. military conflict following the development of
this philosophy, the Vietnam War, did not neatly fit the “New Look”
164
policy.
In this conflict, the United States committed millions of
troops over a fourteen-year period and lost well over 50,000 American
165
lives. During the Vietnam conflict, U.S. forces were largely supplied
166
through the use of the draft, despite sufficient draft-age manpower
167
168
to form an AVF. Although there was a large military reserve force,
169
it went largely unused, and the continued idleness of this force
armies would become obsolete as air war and the use of tactical weapons would
become the main methods of waging war).
161. See SAKI DOCKRILL, EISENHOWER’S NEW LOOK NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY, 195361 xv (1996) (acknowledging Dulles’s central role in formulating the New Look
policy, but asserting that President Eisenhower was more important in its
formulation).
162. See id. at xii-xvi, 1-5 (indicating that the New Look policy was centered on
superior technology instead of large armies in conflict, and it also included covert
operations, diplomacy, alliances, and foreign military aid).
163. See HENRY KISSINGER, NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND FOREIGN POLICY 93 (1957)
(furthering Dulles’s “New Look” concept by asserting that air war or strategic strikes,
rather than protracted ground campaigns, would characterize future large-scale
military involvements).
164. See United States Army Center of Military History, The Army and the New Look,
in AMERICAN MILITARY HISTORY 572, 579-80, at http://www.army.mil/cmhpg/books/amh/AMH-26.htm (updated Apr. 27, 2001) (describing the growth of the
conflict in Vietnam between Communist guerilla forces sponsored by the Soviet
Union and South Vietnamese forces sponsored by the United States, and the context
of conflicts around the world in which the two superpowers sponsored factions but
did not engage directly, precluding employment of “New Look” components) (on
file with author).
165. See MILITARY ALMANAC, supra note 24, at 47 (reporting the total number of
U.S. armed services personnel serving in Vietnam as 8,752,000, during the years
1961-1975, with 58,198 Americans killed in action). By way of comparison, casualties,
including dead, wounded, and missing, during the three-day Battle of Gettysburg in
the American Civil War totaled more than 50,000. CRAIG SYMONDS, A BATTLEFIELD
ATLAS OF THE CIVIL WAR 67 (1983).
166. See CHAMBERS, supra note 69, at 268 (reporting that sixty percent of enlisted
personnel in 1966 were draftees and that an estimated forty to sixty percent of
volunteers were influenced by the draft in their decision to enlist).
167. See FLYNN, supra note 48, at 228 (stating that the “huge total of 18 year olds
[669,000] suggested that it would be possible to recruit an AVF”).
168. See Report of the President’s Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force 99 (1970)
[hereinafter “Gates Commission”] (reporting a reserve force of over 3.25 million
men as of June, 1969, over 2.6 million of which were enlisted men). Of these
enlisted men, however, approximately seventy-five percent enlisted to avoid the draft.
Id. at 97.
169. See LAWRENCE M. BASKIR & WILLIAM A. STRAUSS, CHANCE AND CIRCUMSTANCE:
THE DRAFT, THE WAR, AND THE VIETNAM GENERATION 50 (1978) (characterizing
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170

reduced the confidence of military planners. In contrast to earlier
U.S. wars, the Vietnam War was characterized by small unit actions
171
rather than large battles. These ground troop confrontations were
coupled with massive bombing against an enemy greatly inferior in
172
173
size.
Nuclear weapons were never a serious option in Vietnam,
and the elusive and insurgent nature of the enemy guerilla forces
174
made strategic bombing problematic.
The increased U.S. reliance on air power in Vietnam was clear,
however, as the Air Force alone dropped 6,162,000 tons of bombs
175
during the war, compared with 2,150,000 tons dropped during
176
The reliance on draftees was likewise apparent, as
World War II.
Selective Service conscripted over two million people during the
177
Vietnam War.
The loss of American lives in Vietnam, while
President Johnson’s reluctance to deploy reserve troops as a political tactic intended
to support the appearance that the U.S. involvement in Vietnam was limited).
170. See Kenneth J. Coffey, Our Nation’s Reserve Forces: Where Do We Go From Here?, in
PROFESSIONALS ON THE FRONT LINE: TWO DECADES OF THE ALL-VOLUNTEER ARMY 99,
100-01 (J. Eric Fredland et al. eds., 1996) (stating that the “credibility and the overall
effectiveness of the guard and reserves suffered badly during this period”).
171. See CLODFELTER, supra note 118, at 241 (noting that, in contrast to World War
II and the Korean War, most U.S. casualties in the Vietnam War came at the hands of
the enemy infantry, rather than from ordnance as is typical of larger-scale
confrontations).
172. See id. at 238 (1995) (placing U.S. force strength in Vietnam in 1967 at
473,000, compared with an estimated enemy ground force of 63,000, but noting that
the actual ground combat forces for the United States numbered less than 50,000).
173. See Morris Janowitz, Beyond Deterrence: Alternative Conceptual Dimensions, in THE
LIMITS OF MILITARY INTERVENTION 369, 378-379 (Ellen P. Stern ed., 1977) (asserting
that use of tactical nuclear weapons had been considered in support of French
Indochinese interests, but strategic U.S. involvement after the French withdraw
centered on conventional bombing in an effort to avoid “disaster in the world
community”).
174. See id. (asserting that the initial sustained U.S. bombing was of limited
effectiveness, but subsequent improved bombing accuracy helped bring about an
eventual cease-fire).
175. See HARRY G. SUMMERS, JR., VIETNAM WAR ALMANAC 100 (1985) (noting that
“considerable” Navy and Marine Corps bombing is excluded from the six million ton
figure attributed to the Air Force).
176. Id.; see also THE UNITED STATES STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY: OVER-ALL REPORT x
tbl. 1 (1945) (placing the total bomb tonnage dropped in Europe alone by the
combined U.S.-British forces at nearly 2.7 million tons). The bombing increased in
the latter stages of both wars. See JEFFREY D. GLASSER, THE SECRET VIETNAM WAR: THE
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE IN THAILAND, 1961-1975, at 108 (1995) (noting that
approximately halfway through the United States’ involvement in Vietnam, U.S.
forces dropped only one-quarter of their eventual total tonnage). In World War II,
over sixty percent of the total bombs dropped by the allies in Europe fell in the last
ten months of the war. MARK CLODFELTER, THE LIMITS OF AIRPOWER: THE AMERICAN
BOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAM 8 (1989); see also U.S. Gov’t Printing Office, THE UNITED
STATES STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY: OVER-ALL REPORT (EUROPEAN WAR) 6-8 (1945)
(illustrating through graphs the dramatic increase in allied bombing toward the
conclusion of World War II).
177. See Induction Statistics, supra note 46 (reporting yearly Selective Service
induction statistics for the years 1964 and 1973, the start and end of the draft,
including a high of 382,010 in 1966).

KAMENS.PRINTER.DOC

2003]

5/14/2003 3:09 PM

SELECTIVE DISSERVICE

727
178

significant, was a fraction of the millions of fatalities. In this regard,
the war was an indication of future U.S. military strategy emphasizing
limited commitment of resources and minimized risk to U.S.
179
personnel.
The Persian Gulf War, the only major U.S. military conflict since
180
Vietnam, was the first major conflict fought without conscripts since
181
the Spanish-American War.
In the first real test of the AVF, a
strategic bombing campaign was followed by a ground campaign that
182
This strategy
claimed victory after only four days of fighting.
minimized the risk to U.S. personnel by inflicting immense damage
on Iraqi forces with bombs and missiles, before meeting the Iraqi
183
forces on the field of battle. In the hands of an enemy such as Iraq,
similar advanced weaponry put U.S. forces at risk and extended the
184
concept of harm’s way beyond the front lines of the battlefield.
Although U.S. forces in such a scenario are now at risk far behind the
front lines, an examination of U.S. war casualties shows a dramatic
decline in deaths as a percent of total participants, culminating in
185
minimal Allied casualties in the Gulf War.

178. See News Release, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, at http://www.rjsmith.com/
kia_tbl.html#press (Apr. 3, 1995) (reporting Vietnamese government estimates,
released on the twentieth anniversary of the official end of the Vietnam War, that
approximately four million Vietnamese civilians and more than one million
combatants died as a result of war during the years 1954-1975) (on file with author).
179. See supra notes 149-60 and accompanying text (surveying technological
advances in warfare that were long in development and finally widely and successfully
employed by the United States in the Persian Gulf War).
180. See MILITARY ALMANAC, supra note 24, at 50-53 (listing eighty-nine selected
U.S. military actions between 1975 and 2001, with no other operation approaching
the enormity of Operation Desert Storm).
181. See Induction Statistics, supra note 46 (reporting numbers of men entering the
military through the Selective Service System during World War I, World War II, the
Korean War and the Vietnam War). See also CHAMBERS, supra note 69, at 136-38
(suggesting that a primary reason President Wilson instituted the draft in World War
I was to prevent political rival Theodore Roosevelt from raising and leading a
volunteer army as Roosevelt had in the Spanish American War).
182. See generally MAZARR, supra note 31, at 125-57 (narrating the brief and decisive
allied ground campaign in the Gulf War).
183. See id. at 99 (describing the near-total destruction of Iraqi forces before the
Allied ground forces confronted the Iraqi army).
184. See Presidential Commission on the Assignment of Women in the Armed
Forces, Report to the President, 93 (GPO 1992) (observing that the transformation of
modern warfare has resulted in greater combatant mobility and fluidity of action
which, coupled with the advances in the accuracy and destructiveness of weaponry,
have undermined the traditional concept of front-line combat).
185. See Statistical Summary of America’s Major Wars, at http://www.cwc.
lsu.edu/cwc/other/stats/warcost.htm (last modified June 13, 2001) (comparing
casualty ratios in American wars on a per month of war basis, with an approximate
steady rise in deaths peaking at World War II, and steadily declining to the Persian
Gulf War’s lowest rate of U.S. casualties per month since the Mexican-American War)
(on file with author).
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The Persian Gulf War likely signaled the end of U.S. involvement
186
The decisive defeat of the
in major ground-troop confrontations.
Iraqi army demonstrated how U.S. superiority in virtually all areas of
the military arts allowed the U.S.-led forces to defeat a much larger
187
Iraqi army by employing mobile forces. The U.S. armed forces and
the American public were justifiably impressed with this illustration of
188
a new type of war
emphasizing rapid strategic response,
189
containment, coalition building, and setting limited goals.
After the breakup of the former Soviet Union, U.S. military strategy
190
underwent further revision. The United States’ once great military
foe was reduced to smaller, poorly trained and poorly equipped
191
armies. With no military equal, the United States reduced the size
186. See MAZARR, supra note 31, at 98 (likening the U.S. operation in the Persian
Gulf to high-tech guerilla warfare, and suggesting that the armies attempting to fight
“static linear wars” would become obsolete in much the same way as the cavalry as
used against the German advance in World War II).
187. See supra notes 182-83 and accompanying text (chronicling the pre-assault
bombing and subsequent swift ground war victory of the allied forces). See also
MAZARR, supra note 31, at 131-32 (placing the size of the defending Iraqi army at
approximately 500,000 and the size of the allied army at approximately 250,000).
188. See supra notes 149-54 and accompanying text (discussing public perceptions
of the advanced weapon technology used in the Persian Gulf War). But see generally
MIDDLE EAST WATCH, NEEDLESS DEATHS IN THE GULF WAR: CIVILIAN CASUALTIES DURING
THE AIR CAMPAIGN AND VIOLATIONS OF THE LAWS OF WAR, supra note 152, at 113-28
(discussing the frequent inaccuracy of precision bombing and the fact that most
bombing was not precision bombing, despite the impression conveyed to the public
by the Pentagon and Bush Administration in an orchestrated media relations effort
to promote the success and use of these weapons). After the Gulf War’s conclusion,
allegations and evidence surfaced of bombs missing targets and hitting civilians
instead. Id. Ten years later, similar reports surfaced after the United States military
involvement in Afghanistan. See Dexter Filkins, Flaws in U.S. Air War Left Hundreds
Dead: Faulty Intelligence and Overwhelming Force Are Seen as Factors in Afghan Toll, N.Y.
TIMES, July 21, 2002, at A1 (reporting a pattern of air strike mistakes that took as
many as 400 Afghani civilian lives in eleven locations).
189. See MAZURR, supra note 31, at 161-63 (referring to the Persian Gulf War as a
“test case of [the] post-cold war concepts” in which the United States would maintain
regional stability throughout the world by leading rapid, cooperative deployments of
limited duration); DENNIS MENOS, ARMS OVER DIPLOMACY: REFLECTIONS ON THE
PERSIAN GULF WAR 84 (1992) (contrasting the success of the allied coalition during
the Persian Gulf War with the failure of the United States’ protracted and essentially
non-cooperative campaign during the Vietnam War). But see id. at 86-87 (crediting
public relations, exaggeration of Iraqi troop strength, and military control of
operations for much of the overwhelming victory, and suggesting that Americans
were deceived by an image of a masterful victory when in fact the Allied forces
defeated a poorly equipped army and inflicted large amounts of immediate and
long-lasting losses on Iraqi civilians); MAZARR, supra note 31, at 166-67 (noting that
the strategic reason for high-technology weapons, which was not based on limiting
U.S. casualties, may have shifted public opposition).
190. See MILITARY ALMANAC, supra note 24, at 9-10 (describing the transformation
of the U.S. military, which focused primarily on the Soviet Union, an opponent of
approximately equal military strength, during the Cold War).
191. See MAZARR, supra note 31, at 5-12 (discussing the shift in the focus of U.S.
defense priorities from a singular enemy superpower to a variety of potential
regional conflicts).

KAMENS.PRINTER.DOC

2003]

5/14/2003 3:09 PM

SELECTIVE DISSERVICE

729
192

of the AVF by nearly twenty-five percent between 1992 and 2000.
Even with the post-Cold War reduction in force, the United States
maintains a standing armed force of nearly 1.4 million persons, the
193
second largest standing army in the world after China’s 2.5 million.
Mutual agreements between various allies assure adequate forces
194
The lessons
should conflicts with foreseeable enemies arise.
learned in the Persian Gulf War have been applied to a post-Cold
War world of unrivaled U.S. military power and are reflected in the
195
current strategic planning of the armed forces.
To better react to
escalating regional developments, the current planning emphasizes
rapid deployment of smaller forces and strategic placement and use
196
of air and naval forces. The increasing success of the AVF and the
increased confidence of the military leaders in the AVF have been
197
major components in this change in strategy. The issue of the draft
rarely comes up at all and does not appear to be a part of modern
198
military strategy or analysis.
192. MILITARY ALMANAC, supra note 24, at 21.
193. See id. at 11 (providing a chart entitled “Military Strengths of U.S., Allied, and
Selected Other Armed Forces”).
194. See id. (reporting the number of active and reserve United States and allied
troops, primarily South Korean and NATO, to be over fourteen million, compared to
the fewer than 8.5 million maintained by potential enemies, as defined by the
Department of Defense as including Cuba, Iraq, Iran, Libya, North Korea, Sudan,
and Syria, all with lower capabilities in virtually all areas of defense, including
communications, intelligence, and training). See also id. at 61-64 (surveying the
mutual security agreements affecting Europe and Asia which the U.S. is a party to or
which augment U.S.-involved security guarantees).
195. See id. at 9-10 (describing the move in the armed forces’ four branches and
among the Joint Chiefs of Staff toward mobility, flexibility, greater technological
superiority in weaponry, transportation and communications, and increased allied
operations).
196. See id. at 9 (noting the Army’s goal to mobilize five standing divisions
anywhere in the world within thirty days as an example of the current emphasis in
defense planning on anticipatory or rapid response to regional trouble spots).
197. See Jim Garamone, DoD Celebrates 25 Years of the All Volunteer Force, Am. Forces
Press Serv., at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jul1998/n07101998_ 9807096.html
(last visited July 18, 2002) (quoting Deputy Defense Secretary John Hamre, “[the
AVF] is far more professional, more stable, largely married, and [it] reflects
America,” and Undersecretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness Rudy deLeon
“[the AVF] is widely regarded as the most capable and professional force in the
world . . . [i]t is the model for militaries around the world . . . [it] won the Cold War
and has met every challenge since”) (on file with author).
198. See generally MILITARY ALMANAC, supra note 24 (containing eighty pages of
analysis of present and future military challenges, with no mention of conscription,
registration, or any related topic); JOHN JESSUP, A CHRONOLOGY OF CONFLICT AND
RESOLUTION, 1945-1985 (1989) (chronicling U.S.-Soviet relations in a detailed 838page political timeline, without mentioning the U.S. imposition of draft registration
in 1980, though President Carter presented the imposition as necessary to send a
significant statement to the Soviets). A search of the DoD website finds the draft or
registration mentioned only in historical context, in reference to enlisted men’s
obligation to register, or as part of recruiting campaigns coordinated with Selective
Service mailings.
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B. The All-Volunteer Force
The AVF as it exists today dates to 1973, but for most of U.S.
199
history, the federal armed forces have been a volunteer force.
In
fact, the United States has used a military draft in only thirty-seven
200
years, primarily between 1940 and 1973. The AVF is characterized
as a smaller, more career-oriented, better trained, and better
qualified force intended to serve modern U.S. military needs without
201
the aid of drafted troops. The current AVF grew out of a variety of
202
influences, some older than the draft it replaced. Questions about
fair application of the draft arose increasingly during the Vietnam
203
War as a result of flexible deferment and qualification standards.
As general opposition to the Vietnam War grew, so did opposition to
204
the draft, which was seen as making the war possible.
Major opposition to the draft came from a group of libertarianleaning Republican members of Congress, including Barry
Goldwater, who argued in 1963 that conscription both contradicted
the concept of liberty and encouraged inefficient personnel
205
management.
President Johnson successfully opposed these
199. See COOPER, supra note 49, at 46 (stating that the United States has only
resorted to conscription during approximately thirty-five years of its existence).
200. See THE MILITARY DRAFT: SELECTED READINGS ON CONSCRIPTION endpages
(Martin Anderson et al. eds., 1982) (providing a timeline entitled “Wars and
Conscription”).
201. See Walter Y. Oi, Historical Perspectives on the All-Volunteer Force: The Rochester
Connection, in PROFESSIONALS ON THE FRONT LINE: TWO DECADES OF THE ALLVOLUNTEER ARMY 38, 49 (J. Eric Fredland et al. eds., 1996) (noting the changed
demands upon U.S. armed forces and the increased need for highly skilled
personnel, which resulted in a better-compensated and smaller AVF).
202. See id. at 40 (describing conscription practices just before World War II where
exemptions were granted to “farmers, fathers, and conscientious objectors,” and
African Americans were underrepresented perhaps due to segregationist practices,
which would require separate African American officers).
203. See id. at 41 (pointing to a rise in draft age population that allowed draft
boards to raise minimum standards and more liberally grant deferments). That so
much discretion was granted to draft boards, who served on an entirely voluntary
basis, eventually resulted in charges of favoritism, and indeed certain groups,
including African-Americans, bore a disproportionate share of the defense burden.
Id.; see also FLYNN, supra note 48, at 205-06 (asserting that opposition to the Vietnam
War among African Americans grew as they discovered that young African American
men were much more likely to be drafted than population percentages would
otherwise suggest); STEPHAN M. KOHN, JAILED FOR PEACE: THE HISTORY OF AMERICAN
DRAFT LAW VIOLATORS, 1658-1985, at 79-82 (1986) (discussing minority opposition to
the Vietnam war and the lack of minority representation in the selection process).
204. Oi, supra note 201, at 42 See generally KOHN, supra note 203, at 73-99
(chronicling the inextricably linked issues of opposition to war and opposition to
conscription).
205. See Oi, supra note 201, at 41-42 (noting that these critics argued that the draft
saved money on salaries in the short term, while losing money in the long term
through turnover of personnel and expensive retraining); see also FLYNN, supra note
48, at 189 (describing a study of the draft called for in 1964 by President Lyndon
Johnson as a response to opposition to the draft from his Republican presidential
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Congress members’ efforts to launch a study of the draft that focused
206
on economic and liberty issues by producing his own study.
Johnson’s study, however, was not completed until 1965 and was not
207
released for another year.
A growing number of voices, including
civil rights advocates, conscientious objectors, Libertarians,
Republicans, and Democrats, forced increasing attention to the issue
208
of the draft.
As the 1968 presidential elections approached,
209
candidates voiced their opinions on the draft issue to U.S. voters.
Among those opposed to conscription were former Vice President
Richard M. Nixon, who made his opposition part of his 1968
210
presidential campaign.
Nixon defeated Vice President Hubert Humphrey in the 1968
211
presidential election, aided in part by voter discontent over the
212
general conduct of the war by the Johnson Administration and
213
Nixon followed through on his
possibly over the draft as well.
rival, Barry Goldwater and noting that the study offered little hope of curing
problems with the draft).
206. Oi, supra note 201, at 41-42.
207. Id. at 42.
208. See generally FLYNN, supra note 48, at 188-223 (chronicling opposition to the
draft, based on legal, moral, economic, social and political concerns, voiced by a
varied and expanding array of special interest groups between the 1964 and 1968
presidential elections). While opposition to the draft came from a broad section of
the U.S. political and social spectrum, the draft was not always widely unpopular
during the Vietnam War. See id. at 219 (reporting several polls and surveys that
indicated general popular support of the draft in the years 1967-68).
209. See id. at 225 (describing the varying degrees to which politicians Eugene
McCarthy, George Wallace, Nelson Rockefeller, Hubert Humphrey, and Richard
Nixon incorporated discontent over the draft into their campaign platforms).
210. See Richard M. Nixon, The All-Volunteer Armed Force, in THE MILITARY DRAFT:
SELECTED READINGS ON CONSCRIPTION 603-08 (Martin Anderson & Barbara Honegger
eds., 1982) (pledging to end the military draft at the conclusion of the Vietnam
War). But see RICHARD NIXON, THE REAL WAR 201 (1980) (reconsidering his
opposition to a draft in light of perceived AVF failures). The contrast between
Nixon’s two views on the draft reveals the political motives dictating his positions. See
FLYNN, supra note 48, at 225 (asserting that Nixon’s vocal opposition to the draft
developed as part of his political comeback after losing the 1960 presidential election
and the 1962 California governor’s race). While this position may have evolved for
Nixon, it was not incompatible with the views of many Republicans. Id.; see also Oi,
supra note 201, at 41 (noting that twenty-four House Republicans were also pressing
for draft reform in 1964).
211. See Dean Blobaum, Chicago ‘68: A Chronology, at http://www.geocities.com/
Athens/Delphi/1553/c68chron.html (last visited Jan. 25, 2003) (describing the
events in 1967-68 which led the Democratic Party to nominate Hubert Humphrey
rather than President Johnson as its candidate in the 1968 election, and noting role
of the “Dump Johnson” movement, which was dedicated to putting forth a candidate
committed to ending the Vietnam War) (on file with author).
212. See FLYNN, supra note 48, at 236 (noting Nixon’s recognition of the broad
discontent stemming from the Vietnam War, for which the draft stood as a symbol).
213. See Martin Binkin, Commentary, in PROFESSIONALS ON THE FRONT LINE: TWO
DECADES OF THE ALL-VOLUNTEER ARMY 124, 124 (J. Eric Fredland et al. eds., 1996)
(asserting Nixon’s anti-draft strategy was as much an instrument to gain the
presidency as it was an expression of political ideology). Binkin calls the AVF one of
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commitment to create the AVF by appointing the President’s
Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force (Gates Commission),
214
In February
chaired by former Defense Secretary Thomas Gates.
1970, the Gates Commission issued its report, containing views on
conscription versus an AVF and budgetary and management
215
recommendations for the implementation of an effective AVF. The
report’s findings reprised the assertions of Goldwater and other draft
critics that past comparisons of conscription versus an AVF had not
accounted for all costs when concluding that conscription was more
216
economical.
Among the report’s recommendations were:
217
(1) reconsideration of the importance of reserve forces; (2) reform
218
of military pay to better recruit volunteers; (3) a restructuring of
219
ground force personnel; and (4) maintenance of registration for a
220
The implementation of these recommendations
standby draft.
Nixon’s “few positive legacies,” but stops short of asserting that it actually helped him
win the election. Id. It is unclear how great a role Nixon’s position on the draft
actually played in the election. See FLYNN, supra note 48, at 226 (contending that
voters surveyed did not indicate a popular discontent with the draft). Regardless,
Nixon’s victory carried the AVF concept into office with him. See id. at 236-41
(asserting that Nixon’s continuing interest in reforming and eventually eliminating
the draft after he took office was tied to his desire to both pacify a discontent over
the Vietnam War and court draft age men as supporters of Nixon and the
Republican Party).
214. See Gates Commission, supra note 168, at vii (naming Gates as Chairman of
the Advisory Committee of the AVF).
215. Id.; see also Studies Prepared for the President’s Commission on an All-Volunteer
Armed Force (1970) (containing studies prepared for the Commission upon which the
Commission’s recommendations were largely based).
216. Gates Commission, supra note 168, at 28. The report further pointed to
various economic costs tied to drafting young men, such as preventing them from
contributing to the economy, disrupting careers, or forcing career and life choices to
avoid conscription. See id. at 30-33 (noting that the draft also causes unnecessary
problems for the military by creating low morale among troops).
217. See id. at 40 (observing that reservists were underutilized during the Vietnam
War); see also Martin Anderson, The All-Volunteer Force Decision, History and Prospects, in
THE ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE AFTER A DECADE: RETROSPECT AND PROSPECT 10, 13
(William Bowman et al. eds., 1986) (emphasizing that a well trained and equipped
armed forces reserve and National Guard prepared to fight is a far more effective
means of improving military combat readiness).
218. See Gates Commission, supra note 168, at 49 (maintaining that compensation
levels in the early years of military service are too low to attract quality recruits); see
also Oi, supra note 201, at 45-46 (asserting that Congress’s power to conscript at
below market rates kept pay for the first two years of service, the legal maximum term
of conscription, artificially low and therefore imposed a “hidden tax” on young men
to the benefit of other citizens—particularly the wealthy).
219. See Gates Commission, supra note 168, at 36-37 (noting that the ground-force
centered Army had grown during the Vietnam War, as a percentage of the armed
forces as a whole, and that most draftees entered the Army). Because the Navy and
Marines rarely had to resort to a draft and the Air Force never did, most experts
predicted that maintaining Army ground forces would present the greatest challenge
for recruiters in an AVF. Id.
220. See id. at 119-22 (offering the first credible plan for registration without a
draft).
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would figure prominently in subsequent analysis of the successes and
221
failures of the AVF.
Based upon the Gates Commission’s recommendations, Congress
222
passed a bill extending the draft until the anticipated end of the
223
Vietnam War and amending the military pay scale in anticipation of
224
the AVF. Unfortunately, the AVF was not initiated in a particularly
supportive atmosphere, having barely overcome strong opposition
225
from a vocal minority in Congress. In addition, the initial reaction
to the AVF from the existing military establishment ranged from
226
tepid to openly hostile, while the general public held the military
227
itself in low regard in the aftermath of the Vietnam War.
During the 1970s, as the AVF struggled to compete against a strong
job market, Congress failed to improve pay for entering recruits and
228
ended GI Bill benefits.
In an attempt to meet its recruitment
229
230
goals, the AVF was forced to reduce recruitment standards, which
221. See MELVIN LAIRD, PEOPLE, NOT HARDWARE: THE HIGHEST DEFENSE PRIORITY 1
(1980) (discussing the negative effect on recruiting and retention of quality forces
caused by congressional and executive failure to fully implement the Gates
Commission’s proposals for pay increases).
222. See Act of May 5, 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-129, 81 Stat. 649 (1971); see also
COOPER, supra note 49, at 109 (describing how a compromise between the House of
Representatives and the Senate was reached despite large discrepancies in the
amount of funding each House wanted to provide for military pay raises).
223. Act of May 5, 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-129, Title I, § 101(9)(d)-(e), 81 Stat. 649,
1439, 1466 (1971).
224. See id. § 202(a), 81 Stat. 649, 1439, 1471 (granting significant pay raises at the
lowest ranks of the military); see also LAIRD, supra note 221, at 20-22 (demonstrating
that between 1973 and 1981, service pay declined by twenty-five percent in
comparison to minimum wage and by fifteen percent in comparison with the
Consumer Price Index). The author of this study, Melvin Laird, served as Secretary
of Defense under Nixon during the transition from drafted forces to the AVF. Id. at
1.
225. See Anderson, supra note 217, at 11 (pointing out that many political leaders
opposed the formation of the AVF, and noting that criticism from Congress
continued through the AVF’s first decade of existence).
226. See id. (asserting that the AVF was opposed by most senior military leaders);
see also LAIRD, supra note 221, at 2-3 (criticizing the military establishment for
focusing on hardware and technology to the detriment of the AVF); Charles Moskos
& Paul Glastris, To Secure and Reassure: This Time a Draft for the Home Front, Too, WASH.
POST, Nov. 4, 2001, at B1 (characterizing the military’s general resistance to change
as the cause of its resistance to the end of the draft in 1973 and its resistance to the
current calls for the end of the AVF).
227. See George C. Herring, Preparing Not to Refight the Last War: The Impact of the
Vietnam War on the U.S. Military, in AFTER VIETNAM: LEGACIES OF A LOST WAR 56, 58
(Charles E. Neu ed., 2000) (describing the effect that the publicly unpopular war
had on the image of the military, both to outsiders and to the military itself).
228. See Gary R. Nelson, The Supply and Quality of First-Term Enlistees Under the AllVolunteer Force, in THE ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE AFTER A DECADE: RETROSPECT AND
PROSPECT 21, 48 (William Bowman et al. eds., 1986) (concluding that the 1976
elimination of the G.I. Bill, the general failure of military pay to keep pace with
civilian pay, and rising employment rates created a personnel shortage in the 1970s).
229. See Eitelberg, supra note 22, at 71 (observing that enlistment targets are based
on both military and budgetary factors).
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was followed by increased drug use by military personnel, reduced
231
morale, and negative publicity. Despite calls for the resumption of
a draft, supporters of the AVF contended that its shortcomings were
232
attributable to the failure to adequately raise pay.
Eventually,
Congress authorized funds for increased pay, benefits, and
233
recruiting.
234
By the early 1980s, the AVF had raised its standards, and it has
235
met or exceeded its quota almost every year for the past decade.
The recruiting renaissance in the 1980s provided the active and
236
reserve forces that conducted the Persian Gulf War. One indication
of how well the AVF performed overall is the fact that from 19902000, the military failed to meet its enlistment requirements only
237
twice, in 1998 and 1999, and even then by a margin of less than
238
The following year, the military easily met its
four percent.
239
enlistment quota despite increasing the size of the quota.
The AVF has consistently filled or nearly filled its ranks, despite a
congressional reluctance to recognize that the military must compete
230. See Nelson, supra note 228, at 37 (characterizing the rise and fall of
recruitment standards with the rise and fall of available personnel as a logical result
of the military competing for labor in a free market).
231. See id. at 67 (characterizing the AVF as being “on the brink of disaster” at this
time). But see Herring, supra note 227, at 59-60 (ascribing these trends to the
declining fortunes of the U.S. war effort in Vietnam).
232. See Milton Friedman, Argument Against National Service (Rebuttal), in
REGISTRATION AND THE DRAFT: PROCEEDINGS OF THE HOOVER-ROCHESTER CONFERENCE
ON THE ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE, 189, 190 (Martin Anderson ed., 1982) (blaming the
low number of enlisted soldiers on the failure of Congress to implement the Gates
Commission’s recommendations for increased pay).
233. See Dorn, supra note 22, at 18 (referencing pay raises of 11.1% in 1981 and
14.3% in 1982).
234. Id. at 20 (noting that in 1973 only sixty-six percent of enlisted men had a
high school degree, but in 1994 that number was ninety-six percent, and tying this
rise in quality to rises in pay and recruiting budgets in the early 1980s, which allowed
for greater selectivity in recruiting).
235. See MILITARY ALMANAC, supra note 24, at 24 (listing a quota satisfaction rate of
100 percent or greater every year from 1990-2001, except 1998 and 1999).
236. See Neil M. Singer, Commentary, PROFESSIONAL ON THE FRONT LINE: TWO
DECADES OF THE ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE 211 (J. Eric Fredland et al. eds., 1996)
(observing the success with which the AVF and reserves conducted the Persian Gulf
War, while acknowledging that recruitment would be an ongoing issue).
237. See MILITARY ALMANAC, supra note 24, at 24 (reporting personnel recruiting
shortfalls of 6,167 in 1998 and 7,912 in 1999). As a result of these shortfalls, some in
Congress called for a revival of the draft. See Military Draft No Solution, CAPITAL TIMES,
Aug. 16, 1999, at 8A (reporting Sen. Strom Thurmond’s suggestion that the draft
might need to be revived to offset recruiting shortfalls). Additionally, some military
recruiters expressed misgivings with the AVF. See Bradley Graham, The Bugle Sounds
But Fewer Answer; Services Rethink Recruiting as Ranks Thin, WASH. POST, Mar. 13, 1999,
at A3 (discussing the dilemma facing military recruiters in trying to interest young
men in the military over other competing paths and interests).
238. MILITARY ALMANAC, supra note 24, at 24.
239. Id.

KAMENS.PRINTER.DOC

2003]

5/14/2003 3:09 PM

SELECTIVE DISSERVICE

735

240

in the job market for personnel.
This reluctance has led to
241
The need for an
inconsistent funding for pay and recruiting.
enhanced pay scale that compensates more for skill and merit than
242
for time served is an ongoing issue. The complex demands of the
modern U.S. military require not only more selectivity regarding
personnel, but also the ability to retain such personnel for longer
243
periods than a draft would allow.
It is difficult to conceive of the
244
military taking a step backward from this position.
C. Women in the All-Volunteer Force
Between 1973, the first year of the AVF, and the 1981 Rostker
decision, women as a percentage of the U.S. armed forces rose from
245
2.5% to 8.9%.
By 1998, that figure reached over fourteen
246
percent. Despite the Rostker Court’s insinuation that women were a
247
marginal element in the military, women are an integral part of the
current AVF and, through their numbers and contributions, are part
248
of the reason that registration is no longer needed.
The Persian
240. See BANDOW, supra note 50, at 126-29 (reviewing the general disagreement
about how best to improve recruiting through equity in military pay). Congress
often provides additional funds for pay increases only after the military reports
drastic shortfalls in certain military professions.
See id. at 129 (describing
congressional appropriations in reaction to low retention rates for pilots and military
personnel).
241. See COOPER, supra note 49, at 392 (characterizing military pay historically as a
“patchwork” system resulting in relatively high pay for officers and relatively low pay
for enlisted men); see also MILITARY ALMANAC, supra note 24, at 27 (reporting military
entry level salary in 2001 as $16,620).
242. See Oi, supra note 201, at 49-50 (calling for a more flexible system of pay, job
descriptions, and promotions designed to attract skilled personnel and retain them
beyond the military’s traditional twenty-year career).
243. See id. at 48-49 (emphasizing the changes in technology utilized by the
modern military that make age, physical strength, and stamina less important than
specialized training).
244. See id. at 49 (asserting that the former image of military personnel as
common laborers is as outdated as the military draft is obsolete).
245. Binkin & Eitelberg, supra note 111, at 83.
246. United States Department of Defense, Active Duty Strength Male/Female for
September 1998, at http://web1.whs.osd.mil/mmid/military/ms5.pdf (last visited Feb.
5, 2003) (stating that as of September 1998 the Marine Corps consisted of 5.65%
women, the Navy 13.26%, the Army 14.83%, and the Air Force 18%).
247. See supra notes 108-14 and accompanying text (suggesting that the
prohibition against women in combat, coupled with the possibility that all personnel
may at some point need to fight, severely limits the use of women in the military).
248. See William L. O’Neill, Women and Readiness, in WOMEN IN THE MILITARY 172,
180 (Rita James Simon ed., 2001) (articulating the DoD position that defense
readiness is enhanced by opening up more positions to women). Women are more
likely than men to request support positions rather than the combat positions that
are open to them. Id. at 173. This issue, however, has not been a problem for DoD
or prevalent in the public debate. Id. Where the Rostker Court accepted the
government’s position that the contribution of women to the military was limited by
restrictions against women in combat, DoD simply enlists women for the positions
that the women choose and that they are permitted to fill. Id.
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Gulf War not only highlighted the role of women in the AVF
generally, it also showed why traditional notions of women in combat
249
The
roles are less relevant in the modern style of U.S. warfare.
American public’s notions of the limitations of women in war also
250
have undergone a significant transformation. Following the war, a
variety of polls showed that the majority of Americans believe women
should be allowed a greater role in the U.S. armed forces, including
251
serving in combat positions.
In 1994, the military retired the “Risk Rule” that defined positions
in the military that excluded women based upon the position’s
252
proximity to combat, and replaced it with a rule that barred women
253
Women are now permitted in
only from direct ground combat.
more than ninety percent of all job categories in all branches of the
254
armed services.
The actual number of jobs available to women is
heavily tied to the ground combat exclusion rule and the relative
255
level of ground-combat engagement for each branch of service.
256
The Rostker Court regarded women as outsiders to the military, yet
257
women now account for approximately one-seventh of the AVF,
indicating that it is time to rethink the Court’s assumptions.

249. See James Milko, Beyond the Persian Gulf Crisis: Expanding the Role of
Servicewomen in the United States Military, 41 AM. U. L. REV. 1301, 1315-17 (1992)
(noting that the reach of modern weaponry blurs the lines between combatants and
support personnel, resulting in a greater integration of participating women into any
military operation, and that modern U.S. warfare strategy is much less groundcombat centered).
250. See id. at 1322-23 (discussing how the public’s opinion of women in combat
was transformed by female participation in the Persian Gulf War and the public’s
evolving views on the issue as influencing the liberalization of combat exclusion
rules).
251. See, e.g., id. at 1323 (reporting a post-Gulf War Gallup poll finding seventynine percent of Americans supported the opening of combat roles to women).
252. See Fenner, supra note 113, at 13 (asserting that the end of the “Risk Rule”
merely acknowledged a long-standing military practice of ignoring the rule when
military need dictated otherwise).
253. See Aspin, supra note 133 (stating that “[s]ervice members are eligible to be
assigned to all positions for which they are qualified, except that women shall be
excluded from assignment to units below the brigade level whose primary mission is
to engage in direct combat on the ground . . . .”).
254. Mady W. Segal et al., Gender and the Propensity to Enlist in the U.S. Military, in
WOMEN IN THE MILITARY 49, 49 (Rita James Simon ed., 2001).
255. Id. (noting that sixty-two percent of positions in the Marine Corps are open
to female service members, followed by seventy percent in the Army, ninety-four
percent in the Navy, and ninety-nine percent in the U.S. Air Force).
256. See supra notes 108-14 and accompanying text (tying the eligibility of women
to participate in the military to their participation in combat, which was prohibited
by law and regulations).
257. MILITARY ALMANAC, supra note 24.
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III. REGISTRATION SERVES NO LEGITIMATE DEFENSE INTEREST
The existence of the Selective Service System without a draft will
258
soon enter its thirtieth year. Since 1980, its activities have cost over
259
$500 million. Active registration has been in place for over twenty
years, but Selective Service reported compliance levels of eighty-eight
percent in 2001—well below its all-time high of ninety-seven percent
260
immediately following the Persian Gulf War.
It is doubtful that
Selective Service contributes significantly to national security, even
though it is asserted that Selective Service operates insurance policy
261
against undetermined threats. In fact, President Clinton raised the
issue of Selective Service playing the role of insurance against vague
262
and unforeseen threats. In making this assertion, Clinton rejected
the advice of his own DoD that elimination of the draft would not
263
hinder military preparedness.
If registration makes no legitimate contribution to national
security, as statements and actions by the military and others
264
indicate, courts should no longer defer to congressional judgment
258. See supra note 34 (noting that although registration did not reemerge until
1980, Selective Service continued to register after the draft ended in 1973, and
continued to exist after registration was suspended in 1975).
259. Talking Points: Campaign to End Selective Service Registration, at http://www.
nisbco.org/Talking_Points.htm (last visited Feb. 5, 2003) (arguing for an end to the
Selective Service registration program) (on file with author); see also SELECTIVE
SERVICE SYSTEM, FISCAL YEAR 2000 ANNUAL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED
STATES (reporting an aggregate budget of $444.4 million between the years 1983 and
2000), available at http://www.sss.gov/sssarh.pdf (last visited Feb. 5, 2003).
260. SELECTIVE SERVICE SYSTEM, FISCAL YEAR 2001 ANNUAL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS
OF THE UNITED STATES at 8 [hereinafter 2001 ANNUAL REPORT] (comparing the
compliance of ninety-seven percent in 1991 with compliance levels of eighty-eight
percent in 2001), available at http://www.sss.gov/PDFs/SSS_2001 AnRpt.pdf (last
visited Feb. 5, 2003). Just as Operation Desert Storm appeared to encourage
registration, there have been reports that compliance has also increased since the
attacks of September 11, 2001. See William Lamb, Draft Boards Stand Ready to Serve if
Needed, ST. LOUIS POST DISPATCH, Oct. 23, 2001, at A6 (reporting anecdotal
information indicating a rise in registration following September 11, and reporting
Selective Service figures which show ninety-two percent compliance among draft-age
men).
261. See Robert W. Gambino, The Selective Service System under Fire, WASH. TIMES,
Oct. 6, 1993, at A21 (relating the former director of Selective Service’s remarks that
Selective Service provides insurance that adequate forces can be assembled to meet
undefined future challenges, “a prudent hedge against the unknown”).
262. See Clinton Backs Continuation of Draft Policy, BUFF. NEWS, May 19, 1994, at A17
(reporting the President’s assertion that registration was “a hedge against unforeseen
threats”). President Clinton reprised President Carter’s symbolic characterization of
registration by adding that eliminating registration might send the wrong signal to
our enemies. Id.
263. See id. (revealing that a DoD report prepared for President Clinton asserted
that elimination of registration would have no effect on military preparedness).
264. See Bandow, supra note 10 (reporting DoD’s dismissal of any contribution
that registration makes to national defense). Outside of the Selective Service Agency
itself, few experts in or out of government assert that registration serves a military
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265

on the issue. The preponderance of the evidence indicates that no
266
draft will be called in the foreseeable future. In any event, a system
of ongoing registration is not necessary to conduct a successful draft,
267
should the need arise.
The registration requirement should thus
be considered as separate from a gender-specific draft of combat
268
Removed from the shelter of deference provided to
troops.
269
defense-related decisions, registration ought to be considered with
the same heightened scrutiny required wherever an invidious
270
The gender
discrimination based on gender is revealed.
discrimination imposed by the registration requirement cannot be
supported by a claim that it is substantially related to an important
government interest or even rationally related to a legitimate
271
government interest.

necessity.
See, e.g., id. (identifying a report produced by Congress’s own
Congressional Research Service, which concluded that activating an improved
military reserve force would constitute a better response to unforeseen conflicts than
would drafting registered civilians).
265. See Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 89-90 (1981) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(stating that it is ultimately up to the Court to determine if the discriminatory means
employed in registration were closely and substantially related to government’s stated
objective). At the time of his dissent, Justice Marshall voiced no quarrel with
registration as a legitimate interest connected to raising and supporting armies. Id.
at 88.
266. See infra notes 376-77 and accompanying text (reporting various statements
from within the military that a military draft is unlikely and is not part of current
military planning).
267. See infra notes 325-26 and accompanying text (discussing prior successful
registrations, which began at the onset of war).
268. See Rostker, 453 U.S. at 75-77 (concluding that the standard for assessing the
discrimination against women in registration ought to be the same as that employed
in assessing the discrimination against women in combat). This decision was a
reversal of a lower court ruling, which managed to separate the issue of women in
registration from the issue of women in combat. Rostker v. Goldberg, 509 F. Supp.
586, 597 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
269. See Rostker, 453 U.S. at 67 (asserting that Congress must respect the
Constitution, but the standards applied by the Court may differ where military affairs
are concerned).
270. See id. at 87-88 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (stating that under the heightened
scrutiny test, “[t]he party defending the challenged classification carries the burden
of demonstrating both the importance of the governmental objective it serves and
the substantial relationship between the discriminatory means and the asserted
end”). See also ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES
727 (2002) (terming the intermediate scrutiny test for gender classifications to be
“clearly established”).
271. Compare Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (creating the heightened
scrutiny standard whereby a gender classification will survive an Equal Protection
challenge if it is substantially related to serving an important government objective),
with Penell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 14 (1988) (employing the rational basis
test, under which a law need only be rationally related to a legitimate state interest).
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A. The Armed Forces’ Low Regard for Draft Registration
Initially, it is significant to note that the military does not factor in
272
the use of a draft in planning for military contingencies. This view
apparently has not been altered by the scope of military actions
envisioned by the current Bush Administration against Iraq and other
273
alleged sponsors of terrorism. In fact, the military appears to place
more confidence in its AVF and its reserves than it has at any time in
274
the past. Military activities since the revival of registration in 1980
275
The military frequently has
have never resulted in a draft.
expressed its opinion that a draft is unlikely and that ongoing
276
registration is unnecessary.
A DoD report submitted to President Clinton in 1994 was quite
277
open and explicit in its position on peacetime registration. Despite
278
the military’s subordinate role to the President, the report placed
272. See Military Draft Wouldn’t Be ‘Fair,’ Army Secretary Says, SEATTLE POSTINTELLIGENCER, Mar. 27, 1999, at A3 [hereinafter “Draft Wouldn’t Be Fair”] (reporting
comments by Secretary of the Army Louis Caldera on the inherent unfairness and
impracticality of a draft because so few additional young soldiers are needed, thus
only a small fraction of the draft-age population would actually be conscripted). See
also infra notes 279-81 and accompanying text (emphasizing the abilities of the AVF
and reserve forces to rapidly respond to regional threats envisioned by military
planners, eliminating the need for draftees).
273. See Dana Milbank & Mike Allen, U.S. Will Take Action Against Iraq, Bush Says;
‘All Options Are on the Table’ Against States That Pose Threat, WASH. POST, Mar. 14, 2002,
at A1 (reporting on President Bush’s statements regarding America’s war on terror,
which cited Iraq, Iran, and North Korea as potential enemies, and invoked the threat
of possible limited nuclear attack, but ruled out a draft); see also Doug Bandow,
Fighting the War Against Terrorism: Elite Forces, Yes; Conscripts, No, POL’Y ANALYSIS No.
430, at 3 (Apr. 10, 2002) (observing that the military is in the midst of a
transformation from its former labor-intensive incarnation, which will likely result in
further reductions in force while enhancing defensive capabilities), available at
http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa430.pdf.
274. See, e.g., infra note 279 and accompanying text (expressing confidence in the
ability to respond to crises by using active and reserve forces rather than relying on
drafted troops who are untrained and difficult to mobilize); see also supra note 197
and accompanying text (observing that the military’s declining interest in a draft is
directly tied to their increased confidence in their professional force).
275. See supra notes 237-41 and accompanying text (chronicling the scattered
support in Congress and within the armed forces for a military draft, which has not
come in response to military crises but rather in response to infrequent and relatively
small recruiting shortfalls that were instead corrected by raising salaries).
276. See generally supra notes 277-84 and accompanying text (surveying military
admissions of disregard for draft registration and conscription made both to the
press and in the form of reports).
277. See Review, supra note 140, at 12 (stating that suspending peacetime
registration would present limited risk to national security given the low probability
of the need for conscription).
278. Having clarified at length the military position that draft registration and
conscription were unnecessary, the report concludes that registration should remain
in effect until such time as alternatives have been considered. Id. at 12. A cover
letter from Vice President Al Gore accompanied the report when presented to
President Clinton, in which Gore concurred with the one sentence conclusion,
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more confidence in AVF personnel and reserves than in drafted
279
The report asserted that reliance on draftees delayed
troops.
Korean War mobilization by one year, and it concluded that
280
eliminating registration was unlikely to hinder future mobilizations.
The 1994 report makes the view of the armed forces clear: the
281
elimination of registration would not undermine national security.
The report characterized scenarios that might require a draft as
282
“extremely remote,” asserting that with the demise of the Soviet
Union, the AVF and reserves were capable of meeting “near283
simultaneous commitments,” without resorting to a draft. Current
military planning emphasizes evolution beyond the “two major
theatre war construct,” projecting instead the need for rapid, limited
284
and decisive response by smaller and more mobile contingents.
It is not surprising that the military expresses these positions so
285
Since the
freely in light of its sustained success with the AVF.
Persian Gulf War, DoD has emphasized the quality and mobility of its
forces in operating the most advanced military technology in the
286
world.
The military no longer places great emphasis on mass
287
armies, which it feels it cannot rapidly mobilize. The DoD view of
the AVF is an established fact of U.S. military planning, which greatly

without mentioning the report’s findings. Letter from Vice President Al Gore to
President Bill Clinton (Feb. 18, 1994) (on file with author). President Clinton
disregarded the report. See supra notes 262-63 and accompanying text (examining
Clinton’s decision to maintain draft registration, despite the military’s indication that
registration did not serve national security interests).
279. See id. at 9 (explaining that because the national security threats have shifted
from global conflicts to dangers on a regional scale, the need for draftees on short
notice is reduced).
280. Id. at 12.
281. See id. at iii (emphasizing that any potential risk to national security is
particularly limited because of the low probability that conscripts would ever be
called to service).
282. See id. (citing the improved quality of the AVF as sufficient to respond to
foreseeable needs).
283. See Review, supra note 140, at 12 (minimizing the need for a “safety net on
short notice”).
284. See Rumsfeld, supra note 33, at 2-4 (arguing that planning for such unlikely
large-scale operations has interfered with planning for and investing toward the
more likely smaller-scale regional responses).
285. See supra note 197 and accompanying text (reporting the confidence which
leading DoD officials place in the AVF, based upon its actual performance in military
actions).
286. See supra notes 182-84 and accompanying text (detailing the events of the
Persian Gulf War, which demonstrated the success of the modern U.S. military’s
smaller and better-trained forces operating advanced warfare technology and
minimizing massed army confrontation).
287. See supra notes 185-86 and accompanying text (discussing the strategic
advantage resulting from the Allied emphasis on force mobility in conducting the
Persian Gulf War).
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complicates congressional justification for registration.
It is not
clear what interest registration serves if the DoD believes that it will
never need draftees.
B. The Ineffectiveness of Registration
1.

Selective Service does not fulfill its mandate
In recent years, Selective Service has had great difficulty
289
maintaining its initial success at registering young men.
Although
the Selective Service registration success rate has declined, the agency
has always been innovative in its attempts to induce registration or
290
uncover unregistered persons.
Most of Selective Service’s recent
successes have involved partnerships with states wherein denial of
291
state benefits is imposed for failure to register. Whatever Selective
Service’s actual successes, critics argue that it distorts its own figures
292
to artificially exaggerate the success of its registration rate.
In
addition, Selective Service distorts its registration figures to create the
appearance of a larger pool of conscripts than an actual draft would
293
draw from.
Selective Service also gives a false impression of its
ability to raise draftees by emphasizing the numbers registered
288. See Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 75-76 (1981) (relying on legislative
history, which emphasized that registration was in preparation for the rapid mass
mobilization of conscripts in time of national emergency).
289. See Andrea Stone, Draft Registration Rates are Dropping, Especially in South, USA
TODAY, May 17, 2000, at A8 (reporting an eighty-three percent registration
compliance rate among twenty year-olds in the year 2000, compared with the
reported rate of ninety-five percent in 1990).
290. See Mary Ann Sieghart, Greetings . . . Ice Cream Parlor Patrons Invited . . . to
Register for the Draft, WASH. POST, Aug. 3, 1984, at A2 (describing the illegal Selective
Service purchase of a list of members of an ice cream buyers club to match the
names against their own records and used the list to remind boys who turned
eighteen years old to register).
291. See 2001 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 260, at 12 (announcing that through
2001, twenty-nine states had enacted legislation in support of registration containing
provisions from denial of state educational aid to denial of motor vehicle licenses).
292. See Richard Halloran, Compliance With Draft Registration Is Put at 93%, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 5, 1980, at A14 (reporting that the percentage of registered men fell
below Selective Service expectations even as the base number of those required to
register was underestimated to produce a higher percentage); 25% of Draft-Age Men
Have Not Yet Registered, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 1981, at A14 (reporting Selective Service’s
revised figures, which painted a much less successful picture of registration efforts,
and noting that nearly one-fourth of those required to register had actually
registered).
293. The statistic most frequently reported by Selective Service measures the
compliance of all men ages eighteen to twenty-five. 2001 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note
260, at 8. However, men may register at any point prior to age twenty-six without
incurring permanent penalties. Id. at 7. The draft plan currently in place requires
men to be drafted in ascending order from age twenty and up. Sequence of Events,
supra note 139. Thus, registration can occur well past the likely draft age and still
contribute to this statistic of success.
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without predicting its ability to successfully contact these
294
Indeed, registrants are useless if they cannot be
registrants.
contacted in the event of a draft—and after registration, Selective
Service relies entirely on the registrant to comply with change of
295
address requirements.
Over the years, Selective Service has navigated a careful course,
296
emphasizing its successes while avoiding controversy. To this end,
Selective Service issues a bi-monthly periodical containing press
releases and other self-promotion, along with testimonials of
297
supportive government officials, particularly members of Congress.
No one has been charged with failure to comply with registration
298
Registration critic Doug Bandow, a former Reagan
since 1986.
Administration advisor on military personnel issues, explains
Selective Service’s survival by observing that “government
bureaucracies are almost impossible to kill, no matter how
299
outdated.”

294. See Bandow, supra note 5, at 10 (contrasting Selective Service’s successful
national promotion of registration with ongoing questions regarding accuracy of
information, ability to update information, and data retrieval). See also Jacobs &
McNamara, supra note 44, at 363 (reporting on a Selective Service plan, at least as
old as the current registration, which could start registration from scratch using
current social security and tax information rather than the stale information in draft
registration records).
295. See Bandow, supra note 5, at 10 (reporting the results of a General
Accounting Office survey, which indicated that twenty to forty percent of the
addresses maintained by Selective Service may be out of date).
296. See 2001 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 260, at 7-12 (describing Selective Service
mechanisms designed to promote the ease of satisfying the registration requirement
without appearing confrontational). See also Selective Service System, Backgrounder:
Women and the Draft in America, at http://www.sss.gov/wmbkgr.htm (revised Apr. 5,
2001) [hereinafter “Backgrounder”] (restating the official government position as
defined by the President, Congress, and history, regarding the exclusion of women
from the draft, a position which Selective Service defers to with no apparent attempt
to inject its own opinion) (on file with author).
297. See, e.g., Selective Service System, South Carolina Congressman Floyd Spence Dies,
THE REGISTER, Sept./Oct. 2001, at 4 (reporting the death of a longtime congressional
supporter of Selective Service); Selective Service System, Former U.S. Representative
“Jerry” Solomon Dies, THE REGISTER, Nov./Dec. 2001, at 2 (same).
298. See Seattle Draft and Military Counseling Center, Questions and Answers About
Draft Registration, at http://www.scn.org/ip/sdmcc/register.htm (last visited Feb. 7,
2003) (reporting that twenty-one young men were indicted for refusal to register in
the early 1980s, and explaining that prosecutions of registration dodgers stopped
because the trials of these men actually caused registration rates to drop) (on file
with author).
299. Doug Bandow, A Dishonorable Discharge for Selective Service, TODAY’S
COMMENTARY, available at http://www.cato.org/dailys/09-20-99.html (Sept. 20, 1999)
(on file with author).
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Effective prior registration does not enhance military preparedness
a.

A draft cannot contribute to rapid military mobilization

Regardless of Selective Service successes at registering men, it still
300
must quickly produce soldiers in the event a draft is declared. After
301
legislation supporting a draft is in place, Selective Service estimates
that more than six months will elapse before the first draftees report
302
to training camp.
Whether this timetable assumes that all local
draft boards are up and running is unclear, but it is important to note
that Selective Service has previously experienced shortages of
303
volunteer personnel necessary to operate draft boards.
The fact
that registrants are not classified at the time of registration necessarily
creates delays, by placing the appeals process after rather than before
304
the notice.
In addition to these delays, the training of draftees
305
According to current plans,
takes approximately fourteen weeks.
over nine months would elapse before the first draftees were
306
307
delivered into combat, longer than the entire Persian Gulf War.

300. See Selective Service System, Agency Mission, at http://www.sss.gov/mission.
htm (revised June 25, 2001) (defining Selective Service’s foremost priority “to
provide manpower to the armed forces in an emergency,” which presumably means
rapidly) (on file with author).
301. See 2001 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 260, at 2 (stating that a draft will be
implemented at the direction of Congress and the President under the authority of
the MSSA).
302. Sequence of Events, supra note 139.
303. See Mark Libbon, Selective Service Recruiting Volunteers for Board, Debate Continues
on Whether Draft Boards Necessary, NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE, Jan. 31, 2000, at E15
(describing a volunteer personnel crisis in the Selective Service because
approximately one-third of draft board members nationwide approached their
mandatory maximum of twenty years service). But see 2001 ANNUAL REPORT, supra
note 260, at 28 (reporting that board vacancies ranged from two percent to thirteen
percent by region).
304. See Center for Conscience & War, Basic Draft Information, at
http://www.nisbco.org/DraftInfo.htm (updated as of Mar. 1996) (summarizing each
step in the draft process from registration through the appeals process) (on file with
author); see also Ian Jones, Pacifists Prepare for Possibility of Draft, NAT. CATH. REP., Oct.
19, 2001, at 7 (reporting a concern among conscientious objectors that, should a
draft be called, there are only ten days to establish a claim of exemption from
military duty).
305. Basic Draft Information, supra note 304 (explaining that draftees go through
eight weeks of basic training and six additional weeks of advanced programs before
they are ready for battle).
306. See id. (outlining that under the current draft process, draftees are not even
called up to appear for examination and induction until six and one half months
after the initial Presidential Proclamation).
307. See Operation Desert Storm Chronology: Important Events, at http://www. desertstorm.com/War/chronology.html (last visited Jan. 16, 2003) (reporting the Iraqi
invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990 and Iraq’s surrender to Allied forces on March
3, 1991—only seven months after the start of the Persian Gulf War) (on file with
author).
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The military has minimized the importance of rapidly mobilizing
draftees because its active and reserve forces are fully capable of
308
Drafted troops
rapidly mobilizing for any foreseeable conflicts.
309
would only be required in a prolonged war.
In addition, military
training facilities cannot handle the mass of inductees that a rapid
310
The military neither wants nor needs
draft would produce.
draftees, and it cannot use them in the rapid deployment scenario
311
which is the primary case made for Selective Service registration.
The actual contribution that registration makes to preparedness
312
has never been clearly spelled out.
Congressional justification for
maintaining registration rests partially on the unsubstantiated
assertion
that
registration
tangibly
strengthens
military
313
preparedness.
In response to questions about the relevance of
registration, supporters often cite the importance of the message that
314
But the
registration sends to U.S. citizens and potential enemies.
vague, far-fetched scenarios that envision the use of a draft cannot
support a claim that a draft would rapidly supply troops, because
military planning and Selective Service procedures cannot
315
accommodate such rapid mobilization.

308. See Review, supra note 140, at 6, 12 (placing active and reserve troop strength
at 3.5 million in 1994 and terming that number adequate for any immediate need).
309. Id. at 12.
310. Id.; see also William Mullen, Days of the Draft Board Heading for History Books,
CHI. TRIB., July 4, 1993, § 4, at 1 (reporting political scientist Eliot Feldman’s military
manpower study, which concluded that the Selective Service could produce draftees
much faster than the military could possibly employ them, and noting that the
sudden influx of draftees would result in shortage of barracks space, hospital beds,
and other necessities).
311. See Review, supra note 140, at 12 (concluding that the military would not be
able to absorb the rapid influx of draftees and that ending the draft would not put
national security at risk); see also supra notes 287-88 and accompanying text
(contrasting the difference between the mobilization of draftees envisioned in Rostker
with the military’s concern that draftees cannot be rapidly mobilized).
312. See supra notes 261-63 and accompanying text (noting pro-registration
comments that characterize registration as insurance against non-specific unforeseen
threats).
313. See Jacobs & McNamara, supra note 44, at 363 (suggesting that registration
advocates may not have been able to furnish sufficient support for the vaguely
asserted claim that registration contributed to preparedness).
314. See infra notes 365-75 and accompanying text (discussing and analyzing
claims of registration’s symbolic value and whether this has any military value, which
justifies registration).
315. See infra notes 316-21 and accompanying text (arguing that Selective Service
registration procedures are inaccurate and any time saved by registration in a mass
mobilization is insignificant). But see Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 75 (1981)
(characterizing Selective Service registration as an integral component to the rapid
mobilization of combat troops).

KAMENS.PRINTER.DOC

2003]
b.

5/14/2003 3:09 PM

SELECTIVE DISSERVICE

745

Perpetual registration is not required to implement a draft in a
national emergency

Even if a draft could quickly mobilize draftees in a national
emergency, it is not clear that permanent registration is necessary to
316
support a rapid mobilization.
Selective Service estimates of how
much time would be saved by advance registration have varied
317
greatly.
Shortly after President Carter called for renewed
registration, a report authored by Selective Service Director Bernard
Rostker came to light, which provided support for opponents of
318
registration.
The report recommended that registration be
employed only in the event of a mobilization in time of national
319
emergency.
It also contradicted Carter Administration claims that
registration would save ninety to a hundred days in a massmobilization, asserting that pre-registration would only save seven
320
days.
In both World Wars, registration began only after a draft was
321
called, and yet millions of draftees were rapidly produced. Selective
Service has devised its own plans that would allow mass-drafting
without registration by using up-to-date voter, tax, and Social Security
322
records. A DoD report indicated that in the absence of registration,
modern data processing and information sources such as the Social
Security System and state departments of motor vehicles could be
323
used to quickly produce the same information.
Selective Service
nevertheless maintains an inventory of names, at great expense,
324
whose accuracy is questionable.
This suggests that while Selective
316. See Jacobs & McNamara, supra note 44, at 363 (revealing two Selective Service
plans for conducting a draft without advance registration, both of which were less
controversial than registration); see also Richard Halloran, Report by Draft Director
Assails Registration Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 1980, at A12 (reporting that President
Carter disregarded the Selective Service’s recommendation against registration).
317. See Doug Bandow, Draft Registration: It’s Time to Repeal Carter’s Final Legacy,
POL’Y ANALYSIS No. 86 (May 7, 1987) (suggesting that the widely varying claims for
the improved mobilization provided by advance registration are tied to political
currents and bear little relation to actual mobilization requirements), at
http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa086es.html (on file with author).
318. See Halloran, supra note 316, at A12 (reporting registration opponent Senator
Mark Hatfield’s release of a Selective Service document, which cast doubt on the
President’s claims that registration would speed up mobilization).
319. See id. (detailing Rostker’s recommendation to President Carter, which the
Carter Administration rejected).
320. Id.
321. Jacobs & McNamara, supra note 44, at 363 (noting that millions of draftees
were registered in one day, after draft legislation was signed).
322. See id. (stating that the draftees derived from these lists would be sent draft
notices that would be followed by face to face registration).
323. See Review, supra note 140, at 10 (discussing the effects of eliminating draft
registration).
324. See Bandow, supra note 5, at 10 (citing a GAO survey that suggested that one-
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Service once claimed that it did not even need prior registration to
affect rapid mass-mobilization, it now is unable to contribute to such
325
a mobilization even with registration in place.
Selective Service’s obliviousness to its image in other government
agencies is illustrated by a Selective Service website posting about the
exclusion of women from the draft, which cites data from a 1998
326
General Accounting Office (“GAO”) study.
The 1998 GAO study
examined the impact on the budget of registering women with the
327
Selective Service. The study concluded, without explaining, that
excluding women from registration was consistent with the DoD
policy of prohibiting women from participating in direct ground
328
combat. The 1998 study creates an ironic contrast to another GAO
study, released in 2002, which found the likelihood that a draft might
be needed to be so remote that it recommended shutting Selective
329
Service down. The study further asserted that the system could be
started virtually from scratch for approximately the same amount of
330
money as Selective Service spends per year.
C. Congress’s Registration Decisions Should Be Given No Weight
1.

The deference granted by the Rostker Court to Congress’s draft registration
legislation
In granting deference to Congress’s decision to impose draft
registration, the Rostker Court asserted that such deference to
331
Congress is customary. The Court found that the constitutionality
332
of the gender classification had been duly considered by Congress.
fifth to two-fifths of registered names have unusable addresses).
325. See Jacobs & McNamara, supra note 44, at 363 (suggesting that the stirring
image of mass-mobilization in World War II contributes to a nostalgic desire to
maintain the institution even though it can no longer contribute efficiently).
326. See Backgrounder, supra note 296 (restating the official government position as
defined by the President, Congress, and history, regarding the exclusion of women
from the draft, a position which Selective Service adopts as its own) (on file with
author).
327. See id. (reporting that the GAO study examined the costs of registering
women and concluded that registering women would require amending the MSSA).
328. See id. (explaining that the GAO study did not address advantages or
disadvantages of including women in the draft, or make policy recommendations).
329. SUPPORTING CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT: BUDGETARY IMPLICATIONS OF
SELECTED GAO WORK FOR FISCAL YEAR 2003, at 24-25 (Apr. 2002) (indicating the costs
that would be saved if Selective Service were terminated), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d02576.pdf.
330. See id. (describing that it would take more than one year and $23 million
dollars to reactivate the Selective Service, which is currently in “deep standby” status).
331. See Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 64 (1981) (stating that deference to
Congress is “certainly appropriate” because the lawmakers specifically considered the
MSSA’s constitutionality).
332. Id. But see supra notes 245-57 and accompanying text (discussing the
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The Court added that this deference, even where constitutional issues
are at stake, is given greater weight where national security is at
333
issue.
In support of this position, the Court cited prior decisions, which
upheld government actions in the name of national defense that
334
might otherwise have been deemed constitutionally impermissible.
The cases that the Court cited, however, share one common element:
they uphold military authority over military personnel, facilities and
335
functions.
The only case cited that involved a civilian dealt with a
man who was denied access to a military base to make a political
336
speech. Registration, on the other hand, imposes a defense-related
337
requirement upon millions of civilians. The Court’s consideration
of this imposition of defense-related authority over the civilian realm
consists of citing, with approval, congressional testimony asserting
338
that registration and the draft cannot be considered separately.
2.

Under current circumstances, the Court owes no deference to Congress’s
registration decisions
Strictly speaking, perpetual registration is not a military interest
339
Drafts have occurred without advance
inseparable from a draft.
340
registration, and the current registration has long existed without a

changing and expanded role of women in the military).
333. See Rostker, 453 U.S. at 64-65 (explaining that this case does not “merely”
involve the deference customarily given to Congress, but also involves national
defense and the military in which the Court grants even greater deference to
Congress).
334. See id. at 66-67 (citing multiple cases in which the Court accorded deference
to Congress and the Executive over First Amendment and Due Process challenges).
335. See id. (citing Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (1974) (rejecting a challenge to the
Uniform Code of Military Justice for vagueness); Middendorf v. Henry, 425 U.S. 25
(1976) (giving deference to Congress under its power to regulate naval forces in a
summary court martial case); Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975) (rejecting a
Due Process challenge to the Navy policy of giving females a longer period to be
promoted than males, in order to continue service); Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348
(1980) (upholding a prior restraint on the right to petition for military personnel)).
336. Id. (citing Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976)).
337. See 2001 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 260, at back end page (reporting a total
of 13,610,098 draft-eligible registrants as of Sept. 30, 2001, with well over one million
entering the pool every year).
338. See Rostker, 453 U.S. at 68 (stating that “[r]egistration is not an end in itself in
the civilian world but rather the first step in the induction process into the military
one, and Congress specifically linked its consideration of registration to
induction . . . .”). The Court cites congressional testimony, which implies or directly
asserts that the two are inseparable. Id. at 68, 75-76, 79.
339. See Bandow, supra note 299 (discussing how registration is an outdated policy
and unnecessary for mobilizing civilians in case of war).
340. See id. (asserting that Selective Service, starting from scratch with no advance
registration, produced conscripts within seventy-three days in World War I and
within sixty-three days prior to World War II).
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341

draft. The Selective Service was created as a separate agency within
342
Congressional intent assures the agency’s
the government.
343
The Court itself has recognized that
continued independence.
induction into the military and acceptance into the military are
344
separate processes. While the Court has distinguished conscription
and acceptance into the military from actual induction into the
345
military, induction will generally follow acceptance.
While
registration was long considered together with conscription and
346
induction as a sequential transition from civilian to military life, the
current registration stands alone, clearly the least integral of the
347
three.
Regardless, twenty-two years of registration without a draft
has caused registrations to be inextricably linked to inductions that
348
do not in fact take place. The disconnect between registration and
legitimate military planning dictates a reexamination of the
349
deference that the Court granted Congress in Rostker.

341. See id. (observing that although President Carter reinstated registration, there
has been no draft); see also Jacobs & McNamara, supra note 44, at 363 (noting that in
both World War I and World War II, millions of men were registered in a single day,
after the introduction of draft legislation). That so many registered so quickly in the
face of certain armed conflict raises the question of whether this registration even
facilitates a draft. See id. (discussing equally effective alternatives to registration).
342. See Selective Service System, Background of Selective Service, at
http://www.sss.gov/backgr.htm (revised June 25, 2001) (providing a brief history of
the selective service) (on file with author).
343. See Military Selective Service Act of 1967, 50 U.S.C. app. § 451(f) (2000)
(stating that “[t]he Congress further declares that the Selective Service System
should remain administratively independent of any other agency, including the
Department of Defense.”).
344. See Billings v. Truesdell, 321 U.S. 542, 553-54 (1944) (holding that under
selective service regulations, drafting or acceptance into the military is
distinguishable from induction into the military). The Court asserted that induction
into the military marked the end of a Selective Service System administered process
through which draftees are examined for suitability for service. Id. at 548. The
Court concluded that induction formed the line between civil and military authority,
and that prior to induction, a draftee remained subject to civilian laws. Id. at 559.
345. See Sequence of Events, supra note 139 (describing the draft as a process
which necessarily culminates with induction into the military, unless the draftee is
found unfit for service or receives a deferment or exemption).
346. See Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 68 (1981) (rejecting efforts to separate
consideration of the constitutionality of registration from consideration of the
constitutionality of a draft).
347. See supra notes 339-41 and accompanying text (noting significant past
examples of mass conscription and induction without prior registration, as well as
the current registration’s long existence without serving a draft).
348. See Rostker, 453 U.S. at 68 (asserting that Congress specifically linked
registration to induction, rather than establishing registration as an independent
entity).
349. See id. at 66 (“The operation of a healthy deference to legislative and
executive judgments in the area of military affairs is evident in several recent
decisions of this Court.”).
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In Rostker, the Court reaffirmed its lack of competence in the area
350
of military affairs. The Court found that the military was best suited
351
to make military decisions, subject to the control of elected officials.
But, in doing so, the Court deferred to Congress, which overruled the
352
DoD position in support of the registration of women. The Court
justified its deference by asserting that the DoD supported gender353
neutral registration in the interest of equity only.
Such a
justification can hardly apply now, as DoD’s disinterest in draft
354
registration is gender-neutral. Regarding military affairs, the Court
may be justified in deferring to the competence of the military, but
the Rostker Court offered no evidence that Congress possessed
355
comparably superior competence in military affairs.
The current
members of the Supreme Court possess en toto military experience
356
comparable to that of the members of Congress.
In 1998, the Twenty-first Century National Security Study Group,
an independent organization established by the Department of
357
Defense, undertook a series of studies on U.S. approaches to
358
international and defense issues. One of the Group’s most pointed
359
criticisms was directed toward the members of Congress.
In
general, the Group noted the lack of knowledge and interest on the
350. See id. at 65 (quoting Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 10 (1973) (stating that
“it is difficult to conceive of an area of governmental activity in which the courts have
less competence.”)).
351. Id. at 65-66.
352. See id. at 63 (citing military testimony, which asserted that woman registrants
would increase military flexibility).
353. Id. at 73.
354. See supra notes 277-84 and accompanying text (describing a DoD report,
which indicates the general belief that registration is simply not that important).
355. See Rostker, 453 U.S. at 65-66 (characterizing decisions regarding the military
as best made by professional military, though subject to civilian control).
356. Compare Thomas E. Ricks, The Widening Gap Between the Military and Society,
ATLANTIC MONTHLY, July 1997, at http://www.theatlantic.com/issues/97jul/
milisoc.htm (asserting that congressional disinterest in military affairs can be tied to
the fact that only one-third of the members of Congress have military experience
versus two-thirds during Vietnam) (on file with author), with The Justices of the Supreme
Court, at http://a257.g.akamaitech.net/7/2572422/14mar20010800/www. supreme
courtus.gov/about/biographiescurrent.pdf (last visited Sept. 7, 2002) (noting that
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Stevens are military veterans and that Justice
Kennedy served in the California Army National Guard) (on file with author). See
also generally THE SUPREME COURT JUSTICES 446-505 (Clare Cushman ed., 1995)
(reporting that seven of the nine justices that served on the Rostker court had
military experience).
357. See The National Security Study Charter Update, at http://www.nssg.gov/
About_Us/Charter/charter.htm (last visited Sept. 9, 2002) (stating that the Group is
supported by the President, Congress, and DoD) (on file with author).
358. See MILITARY ALMANAC, supra note 24, at 5 (calling the reports collectively an
“‘action plan’ for the new Administration and the Congress”).
359. The 21st Century National Security Study Group, PHASE III REPORT: ROADMAP
FOR NATIONAL SECURITY: IMPERATIVE FOR CHANGE, at 110-115 (2001), available at
http://www.nssg.gov/PhaseIIIFR.pdf (last visited July 20, 2002).
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part of Congress regarding foreign and defense affairs, and the
report urged congressional leaders to take steps to educate newer
361
It also urged that Congress become more open to
members.
362
outside consultation on complex defense issues.
At present,
Congress possesses no special competence with which to contradict
363
the military view that registration is not a national security issue. Its
decision to maintain gender-specific registration should be subject to
364
heightened scrutiny.
In reexamining its deference to Congress on the issue of
registration, today’s Court would have to consider whether legitimate
national security interests are keeping registration in place, or
365
whether it is being maintained for other reasons. When President
Carter called for the reinstatement of the draft, he declared that its
366
purpose was to “demonstrate [America’s] resolve as a nation.”
Former Carter military advisor Richard Danzig has asserted that he
367
and his colleagues saw the registration issue as purely symbolic.
Within the Carter Administration, it was assumed that a drafted force
could not be rapidly mobilized in an emergency and registration
368
information would quickly become outdated.
Critics have asserted that registration was and remains nothing
more than a symbolic gesture, which fails even on that minimal
369
level.
Prior to becoming President, Ronald Reagan pointed out
360. Id.
361. Id. at 111.
362. Id. at 114.
363. No member of Congress has persuasively contradicted the military position
on registration and the draft, and in the face of the detailed arguments from the
military and registration critics against registration, congressional arguments appear
incredibly uninformed. See, e.g., Sig Christenson, Officials Speak Against Move to Close
Selective Service System, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, July 30, 1999, at B1 (quoting
several members of Congress from Texas who assert that eliminating registration
would send a message that the United States is not concerned about readiness and
undermine recruiting by creating a false sense of security). Such assertions fail to
answer the military charge that registration does not contribute to readiness, nor do
they explain why a registration that does not contribute to readiness is not itself
contributing to a false sense of security.
364. See supra notes 121-33 and accompanying (analyzing the deference accorded
Congress in Rostker which undermined the heightened scrutiny applied).
365. See, e.g., Review, supra note 140, at iii (citing several symbolic values that are
attached to registration while discounting any significant military value).
366. Kohn, supra note 203, at 101.
367. Kerber, supra note 83, at 117 (citing an interview with Danzig).
368. Id.
369. See Jacobs & McNamara, supra note 44, at 363-64 (elaborating on the
symbolism of President Carter’s registration proposal as one of several measures,
including the U.S.-led boycott of the 1980 Olympic Games in Moscow and a U.S.
embargo on grain and technology sales to the Soviet Union, which were
implemented in response to the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan). The
boycott was intended to embarrass the Soviets, and the embargo to penalize them.
Id. at 364. However, it has never been quite clear exactly what draft registration was
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that advanced weaponry and an experienced standing army and
reserves would symbolize U.S. resolve much better than a registrant
370
The controversy over registration in fact might have been
pool.
counterproductive, indicating to the Soviets that conscription would
371
be met by even greater resistance.
Registration critic Martin
Anderson, a former advisor to President Nixon, referred to Carter’s
message to the Soviet Union by reinstituting registration as “a weak
372
and possibly dangerous response.”
Anderson assumed that the
Soviets would better understand concrete steps toward a stronger
military and would see through the symbolic gesture, which, in turn,
373
provided a false sense of security to Americans.
It appears that
there was a common understanding that the introduction of draft
374
registration was not actually intended to aid in military defense.
The Rostker Court made no assertion that registration as a symbol
375
alone sufficiently satisfies the definition of national security interest.
3.

The political motivations behind registration decisions
Considering the current state of the U.S. armed forces, U.S.
military alliances, and the threat posed by potential U.S. enemies,
military actions that might lead to the imposition of a draft are highly
376
implausible.
Several times since the revival of registration,
recruiting shortfalls or grave world events have resulted in scattered
intended to do, since registration alone does not improve the military. Id.; see also
Bandow, supra note 32, at D3 (challenging President Clinton’s statement that the
suspension of draft registration would send the wrong message to U.S. enemies such
as North Korea and Iraq, asserting that such countries pay no attention to the status
of draft registration, focusing instead on tangible U.S. foreign policy gestures).
370. Bandow, supra note 317.
371. Jacobs & McNamara, supra note 44, at 365.
372. Anderson, supra note 217, at 12.
373. Id.; see also Jacobs & McNamara, supra note 44, at 364-65 (asserting that
registration was likely unnecessary to convince the Soviets that the United States
would both defend its interests around the world and draft an army should war
require it).
374. See Jacobs & McNamara, supra note 44, at 363 (indicating that the symbolic
purpose filled a vacuum left by the failure to show registration’s actual contribution
to military preparedness).
375. Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 75 (1981) (linking the exclusion of women
from registration specifically to the drafting of registrants for combat); see John
Lancaster, No More Draft? Pentagon Concedes Selective Service System May Not Be Necessary,
WASH. POST, Mar. 4, 1994, at A5 (characterizing a 1994 DoD report as extolling the
symbolic value of peacetime registration even as the report concedes that registration
has little foreseeable defense value).
376. See Weiser, supra note 284 (citing a report produced by the Army War College
which concluded that the only scenario in which a draft might be used is if the
United States simultaneously undertakes multiple military campaigns around the
world, a scenario which the report characterized as extremely unlikely). Further, Lt.
Col. Brian Byrne, a Marine Corps manpower official, commented that “the draft is
something we’ve given every little consideration to.” Id.
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377

calls for the revival of the draft.
These events notwithstanding,
since 1981, no presidential administration has ever seriously
378
considered a draft, though all have supported registration.
The imposition of a draft in support of a military operation would
pose serious political consequences for an administration and for
379
members of Congress.
It appears that registration continues
380
because it has sufficient support in Congress. Although registration
381
affects many, it is largely complied with and imposes penalties for
382
noncompliance on only a small fraction of the group it affects.
After thirty years without a draft, compliance likely would be far lower
383
with respect to a draft than compliance with mere registration.
Congressional support for a draft likely would be weak because the
384
draft has far reaching effects for entire families, particularly for
385
General opposition to a draft might be
those called to serve.
377. See Graham, supra note 237, at A3 (reporting that military recruiting
shortfalls have inspired some within the military to consider reviving the draft, even
as they acknowledge that a revival is unlikely).
378. See Bandow, supra note 10 (reviewing the various reasons for supporting draft
registration offered by every administration from President Carter to President
Clinton). Since its revival, every administration has publicly supported registration.
Id.
379. See McCallister, supra note 4, at A23 (reporting that widespread political
resistance resulted when the United States previously instituted a draft subsequent to
entering a war).
380. See infra note 389 and accompanying text (documenting Selective Service
survival through a 1993 congressional vote that threatened its existence).
381. See 2001 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 260, at back end page (indicating that
2,946,115 men reached the age of 18 and registered during the 2001 fiscal year).
382. See id. at 8 (noting that approximately ten percent of those obligated to
register do not, and suggesting that lack of awareness of the requirement is the cause
of most non-compliance); see also supra note 298 and accompanying text (reporting
that prosecutions for failure to register dropped significantly after the trial of several
men who failed to register resulted in declining registration).
383. See Cassio Furtado, Poll: Many College Students Would Dodge Military Draft.
Understanding Seen as Better Curb on Terror, DETROIT FREE PRESS, June 21, 2002, at 7A
(printing results of a poll showing thirty-seven percent of male college students
surveyed said they would try to evade a draft if it were called today). This statistic
suggests that many young men may not connect registration with any actual military
service obligation. Furthermore, a theoretical thirty-seven percent draft noncompliance rate would shift the burden onto those complying, eroding the fairness
of a draft that even Selective Service admits would be inherently unfair. See Draft
Wouldn’t Be Fair, supra note 272 (suggesting that a likely limited draft drawing from a
large pool of registrants unfairly places the burden of service on a small, random
group).
384. See Rumsfeld, supra note 33, at 39-40 (acknowledging the burden of
disruption placed on families of service personnel, particularly those called up from
the reserves). See also Detenber v. Turnage, 701 F.2d 233, 234-35 (noting that
registration is much less a physical intrusion and restriction than that imposed by the
draft).
385. See Carl Weiser, Does Anybody Feel a Draft? Some Calling For Return to Required
Military Duty, TULSA WORLD, Jan. 27, 2002, at A-2 (noting one poll that indicated
seventy-seven percent support among the general public for a military draft, but
reporting another poll that indicated two-thirds of draft age college students who
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further bolstered by the current draft laws, which dispense with the
complex and flexible system of deferments that former drafts
386
If a draft today were as equitable as the current draft
contained.
laws mandate, influential opposition might come from wellconnected individuals who were not able to avoid service as they did
387
in the Vietnam War.
After the Persian Gulf War, Congress attempted to end registration
388
multiple times.
These efforts were characterized by bipartisan
389
and the argument that registration’s expense is not
support
might have to actually serve would oppose a military draft). See also supra note 208
and accompanying text (discussing the wide scope and influence of the anti-draft
movement during the Vietnam War, particularly the opposition of young men
subject to the draft, even though such views were always minority views).
386. See 50 U.S.C. app. § 456 (2000) (outlining deferment and exemptions from
training and service); 50 U.S.C. app. § 456(h)(i)(2) (stating that “[a]ny person who
while satisfactorily pursuing a full-time course of instruction at a college [or]
university . . . shall . . . have his induction [into the draft] postponed (A) until the
end of the semester or term, or academic year in the case of his last academic year,
or (B) until he ceases satisfactorily to pursue such course of instruction, whichever is
the earlier”); see also Selective Service System, How the Draft has Changed Since Vietnam,
at http://www.sss.gov/viet.htm (revised Apr. 22, 1999) (describing the elimination of
the Vietnam era deferment, which required only proof that a man was a full time
student, in favor of deferment that allowed only the completion of the current
semester) (on file with author).
387. See Military Service Records, WASH. POST, Oct. 13, 1992, at A19 (stating that
former Vice President Dan Quayle, former President Bill Clinton, former Speaker of
the House Newt Gingrich, and President George W. Bush all avoided active military
service during the Vietnam War using means that would not be available today); see
also Howard Schneider, Dyson Was Against The Vietnam War; Record Shows He Was
Conscientious Objector, WASH. POST, Aug. 29, 1990, at D1 (revealing that Maryland
Congressman Roy P. Dyson, an ardent advocate of a strong U.S. military, after four
years of student deferment, claimed conscientious objector status during the
Vietnam War). Conscientious objector status is reserved for those individuals, by
reason of “religious training and belief,” conscientiously oppose war in any form. See
50 U.S.C. app. § 456(j) (2000). This excludes political, sociological or philosophical
views and personal moral codes. Id.; see generally Jim Lobe, Chicken Hawks as
Cheerleaders, FOREIGN POL’Y IN FOCUS, Sept. 6, 2002, at http://www.presentdanger.
org/commentary/2002/0209chickenhawks_body.html (documenting the lack of
military experience among Bush Administration officials who are advocating war
with Iraq, including Vice-President Richard Cheney, National Security Council
Advisor Elliot Abrams, and Chairman of the Secretary of Defense’s Policy Board
Richard Perle) (on file with author).
388. See 145 Cong. Rec. H7954-55 (daily ed. Sept. 8, 1999) (reporting a 207-202
House votes to discontinue funding for the Selective Service); 139 Cong. Rec. H4115
(daily ed. June 28, 1993) (indicating a 232-187 House Vote to shut down the
Selective Service); 139 Cong. Rec. S12103 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 1993) (noting the
Senate’s vote to keep the Selective Service alive); see also Guy Gugliotta, Capital
Notebook: Now, Selective Service Is Receiving The Notice, WASH. POST, Aug. 17, 1993, at A19
(reporting a 207-202 House vote to discontinue funding for the Selective Service);
Military Draft in Jeopardy: GOP Threatens to Abolish Agency, FORT. LAUDERDALE SUNSENTINEL, July 16, 1995, at 8A (reporting a move headed by Rep. Newt Gingrich and
Rep. Dick Armey to shut down the Selective Service).
389. See, e.g., J. Craig Crawford, Washington Letter: Not Much Noise in Battle to Save
Selective Service, ORLANDO SENTINEL, July 11, 1993, at A-10 (noting that a House bill to
end Selective Service found support and opposition in like numbers of Democrats
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390

justified by the stated purpose served.
While congressional efforts
to end Selective Service ultimately failed, only a narrow margin kept
391
Selective Service afloat in each instance.
Opposition to registration may present little political risk for left392
liberal or right-libertarian incumbents.
Such non-centrist views
easily accommodate such opposition, and have already been
393
endorsed by their supporters. However, the patriotic overtones that
frequently intertwine with the issue of registration may prove more
problematic to centrist Democrats and Republicans, for whom the
394
wrong choice might become an issue during a reelection campaign.
With the 108th Congress possessing no great competence regarding
395
396
It
military affairs, a bare majority keeps Selective Service alive.
seems then that members of Congress must choose between
maintaining registration, regardless of its national defense value, and
and Republicans).
390. See id. (reporting Congresswoman Patricia Schroeder’s characterization of
Selective Service as a “relic” in voting against appropriating money for it); see also
Gugliotta, supra note 388, at A19 (noting Rep. Fortney Stark’s comment: “Why would
we [Congress] spend $30 million a year to a list of names of young men who turn 18?
It eludes me.”).
391. See, e.g., Kenneth J. Cooper, The People’s Business: Government, Crime and Courts.
How Georgians Voted in Congress. Key Senate Votes, ATLANTA CONST., Sept. 26, 1993, at
G3 (reporting a 58-41 Senate vote to maintain Selective Service following a House
vote to close the agency).
392. See supra note 208 and accompanying text (chronicling the rise of opposition
to the draft during the Vietnam War, beginning with the Libertarian right and the
radical left of the political spectrum, and only gradually gaining support from the
political mainstream).
393. Texas Republican Representative Ron Paul, a chief sponsor of antiregistration legislation, is a former Libertarian Party presidential candidate who
received the highest rating of any House member from the Republican Liberty Party.
Republican Liberty Party, Liberty Index, at http://www.republicanliberty.
org/libdex/LI2001_Over.htm (last visited Oct. 19, 2002) (on file with author).
California Democratic Representative Pete Stark, another frequent sponsor of antiregistration legislation, was one of three House members from that state to receive
and an “A” or higher rating from California Peace Action, out of a total delegation of
fifty-two. California Peace Action, 2001 Congressional Report Cards, at
http://www.californiapeaceaction.org/resources/documents/reportcards2001/repo
rtcards.htm (updated Jan. 24, 2003) (on file with author).
394. See Helan Dewar, War on Terror Colors The Battle for Congress: Rivals Make Use of
‘Nonpartisan’ Issue, WASH. POST, July 5, 2002, at A1, A4 (reporting a prevalent
strategy, used by Republican political candidates in 2002, to examine defense-related
votes of Democratic rivals and attempt to question the patriotism of the Democrat
based upon the voting record); see also Brian Faler, Osama, Saddam and Max? Cleland
Cries Foul, WASH. POST, Oct. 14, 2002, at A4 (reporting a negative ad campaign used
by an opponent of Georgia Senator Max Cleland, which portrayed Cleland’s votes
against certain aspects of President Bush’s Homeland security program as indicative
of Cleland’s lack of courage in the face of terrorism). Cleland is a decorated veteran
who lost an arm and both legs during the Vietnam War. Id.
395. See supra notes 359-64 and accompanying text (characterizing Congress as an
institution as lacking knowledge and interest in military affairs).
396. See Kenneth J. Cooper, supra note 391, at G3 and accompanying text (noting
that frequently only one House of Congress favors registration).
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allowing a vote against registration to potentially become a campaign
397
issue. The Supreme Court should not defer to the wisdom of this
slim majority, whose judgment is guided by the influence of non398
defense interests, such as reelection.
VI. THE FUTURE OF DRAFT REGISTRATION
By October, 2002, the United States indicated its intention to again
399
go to war with Iraq.
This prospect is coupled with renewed
400
In the
warnings of terrorist attacks against the United States.
immediate aftermath of September 11th, Secretary Rumsfeld was
noncommittal about whether a military draft was indeed in the
401
future. More recently, Rumsfeld asserted that there was “not a
402
chance” of a military draft being reinstituted. Despite reports that
403
Rumsfeld has been at odds with the armed forces, the conflicts
center on greater civilian control over military functions than over
404
personnel issues.
A resolution calling for the elimination of Selective Service was
been introduced by Reps. Ron Paul, Cynthia McKinney, and Pete
397. See Bandow, supra note 299 (construing President Clinton’s support of
registration as a political choice directly linked to Clinton’s own draft evasion).
398. See Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 65-66 (1981) (acknowledging legislative
and executive branch oversight of military affairs, while asserting that the military is
best informed to make judgments on military affairs). The Rostker Court added that
Congress, although accorded great deference in its military decisions, is nonetheless
generally subject to the Due Process Clause of the Constitution. Id. at 67.
399. See Dana Milbank, Bush Bids to End Impasse at U.N., Outlines Iraq Plan, WASH.
POST, Oct. 12, 2002, at A1, A11 (noting President Bush’s increased confidence after
Congress overwhelmingly approved the use of force in Iraq).
400. See Dana Priest & Susan Schmidt, Al Qaeda Threat Has Increased, Tenet Says:
Panel Told Recent Attacks Evoke Pre-9/11 Dangers, WASH. POST, Oct. 18, 2002, at A1
(indicating CIA Director George Tenet’s view that a string of terrorist attacks around
the world could be a prelude to more attacks on U.S. soil).
401. See Department of Defense, DoD News Briefing—Secretary Rumsfeld, at
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Sep2001/t09252001_t0925sd.html (Sept. 25,
2001) (characterizing a draft as “not something that we’ve addressed, and . . . not
something that is immediately before us. There’s no question but we may have to
make additional call-ups under the emergency authority.”) (on file with author).
Rumsfeld added that he did not foresee a draft taking place. Id.
402. See Selective Service System, Statement: Status of the SSS After the September 11th
Terrorist Attacks on the U.S., at http://www.sss.gov/statement.htm (revised Sept. 30,
2002) (posting Rumsfeld’s September 18, 2002 assertion that a draft was not needed
because the military attracts and retains sufficient personnel) (on file with author).
403. See Vernon Loeb & Thomas E. Ricks, Rumsfeld’s Style, Goals Strain Ties in
Pentagon: ‘Transformation’ Effort Spawns Issues of Control, WASH. POST, Oct. 16, 2002, at
A10 (reporting tension between Rumsfeld and the branches of the armed forces,
including a conflict with the Army over the maintenance of large traditional ground
forces, which the Army favors, versus Rumsfeld’s desire to further modernize the
armed forces to an “information age” force for the 21st Century).
404. Id. (reporting the dissatisfaction between the Secretaries of the Army, Navy,
and Air Force, resulting from a perceived lack of autonomy and input on major
decision making).
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405

Stark in 2002.
The resolution noted that the armed services have
406
had no trouble filling their ranks on the basis of voluntary service.
The resolution even noted with a touch of irony that Russia is
407
eliminating its military draft.
The resolution was referred to the
408
Committee on Armed Services, and will not likely go far in the
409
current wartime atmosphere.
In contrast, Rep. Nick Smith introduced the Universal Military
410
Training Act of 2001.
This bill demonstrates the lack of military
411
The bill calls for all
knowledge possessed by some in Congress.
men between the ages of eighteen and twenty-two to be conscripted
or volunteer for military training for a period of six months to one
412
year, essentially requiring all men to train for the reserves. The bill
413
graciously allows women to volunteer for such training.
Peace
activists are not amused by the symbolism of such a draconian
proposal, asserting that it, like draft registration, is an advertisement
414
for war.
While Congress stands deadlocked, those subject to registration
face an ever greater array of sanctions for non-compliance, including
415
greater difficulty obtaining a driver’s license.
The denial of a
driver’s license may actually punish individuals such as immigrants, a
group that Selective Service itself acknowledges may not register
416
simply because they do not understand the requirement.
405. H.R. Con. Res. 368, 107th Cong. (2002).
406. Id. at 2.
407. Id.
408. Id. at 1.
409. See supra note 394 and accompanying text (noting the danger that
congressional votes against military legislation may be cast by political opponents as
unpatriotic).
410. H.R. 3598, 107th Cong. (2001).
411. See supra notes 355-63 and accompanying text (analyzing the presumed
abilities of Congress to oversee military affairs).
412. Universal Military Training Act of 2001, H.R. 3598, 107th Cong. § 4(a)
(2001).
413. Id. § 3(b).
414. See Mario Hardy Ramirez, Central Committee for Conscientious Objectors Position
Paper: The Universal Military Training and Service Act of 2001—H.R. 3598, at
http://www.objector.org/positionpaper.html (last visited Oct. 15, 2002) (conceding
that the bill will not likely pass but expressing alarm that it could even be
introduced) (on file with author). The Position Paper quotes J.E. McNeil, director
of the Center for Conscience and War, as asserting that such a proposal has no
defense purpose and is an indoctrination into militarism. Id.
415. See Selective Service System, State/Commonwealth Legislation, at http://www.sss.
gov/FSstateleg.htm (last visited July 21, 2002) (examining state legislation that
supports the Selective Service registration requirements) (on file with author). A
majority of states have conditioned the receipt of a driver’s license and financial aid
on registration). Id.
416. See infra note 420 and accompanying text (asserting that non-registration
sanctions disproportionately affect low-income and immigrant men who fail to
register in disproportionate numbers).
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Additionally, male immigrants who fail to register prior to the age of
417
Members of this group
twenty-six are ineligible for citizenship.
would be among the immediate beneficiaries should a court rule the
current draft registration unconstitutional and registration and
418
sanctions cease.
CONCLUSION
Selective Service registration’s failure to contribute to national
defense begs the question whether such registration would survive a
419
contemporary constitutional attack.
Prospects for a military draft
are remote, and those negatively affected by their failure to register
420
are a largely underrepresented, underinformed and silent minority.
The issue of draft registration rarely raises widespread concern
421
except during infrequent large-scale military operations, and even
then has not resulted in judicial review or legislative revision of
422
registration.
Consequently, the possibility that a challenge to
registration will make its way to the Supreme Court in the near future
423
may be as remote as the possibility of a military draft itself.
417. Selective Service System, Benefits and Programs Linked to Registration, at
http://www.sss.gov/FSbenefits.htm (last visited July 21, 2002) (stating that the U.S.
Immigration and Naturalization Service makes registration with Selective Service a
prerequisite to U.S. citizenship if the man arrived in the United States before his
twenty-sixth birthday) (on file with author).
418. It is possible, however, that a successful challenge to registration might simply
uphold a gender neutral registration. See Leslie Ann Rowley, Gender Discrimination
and the Military Selective Service Act: Would the MSSA Pass Constitutional Muster Today?, 36
DUQ. L. REV. 171, 184 (suggesting that a legal challenge to MSSA today might result
in the inclusion of women in registration, rather than the elimination of
registration).
419. See Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 59 (1981) (introducing the decision as
examining the discrimination in registration, without comment on the justification
for registration).
420. See Selective Service System, FISCAL YEAR 1999 ANNUAL REPORT TO THE
CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES 6 (1999), available at http://www.sss.gov/
PDFs/regisweb.pdf (last visited July 26, 2002) (quoting Selective Service Director Gil
Coronado’s comment that the low registration rates among minority and immigrant
men may be creating a permanent underclass of persons cut off from a wide range of
benefits) (on file with author).
421. See supra notes 1-6 and accompanying text (chronicling the public debate
about registration that accompanied escalating U.S.-Soviet tensions, the Persian Gulf
War, and military actions following September 11, 2001).
422. See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text (discussing the few legal
challenges that followed Rostker in the 1980s, none since 1985).
423. In light of judicial and legislative reluctance to revise current Selective
Service requirements, it may take a wartime draft to force the issue of inequity. See
Backgrounder, supra note 296 (alluding to the vastly changed role of women in the
military). See generally Fenner, supra note 113, at 23-26 (connecting a more gender
neutral military obligation with women’s attainment of equal voice and citizenship).
But see Rowley, supra note 418, at 184 (asserting that a legal challenge to MSSA today
might result in the inclusion of women in registration, even without a draft, because
men and women are much more similarly situated with regard to combat than they
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Under Rostker, Congress is sheltered by its asserted constitutional
424
power and continues to impose an unfair burden on young men.
This burden is justified as preparation for a conscription that is
unlikely to ever take place and as support to a military that does not
425
want conscripts.
Further, the ever-widening gap between draft
registration and actual military functions undermines the justification
426
for gender discriminations.
Women and men may or may not be
similarly situated with regard to serving in combat, but they are
identically situated with regard to registration if there will never be a
427
draft, as appears likely.
These circumstances differ from those
under which Rostker was decided, and they call for a reassessment of
428
the standards established.
Changed circumstances have not altered the continued imposition
of an invidious classification, which requires men to register or face
429
penalties if they do not. Applying the standards and evidence used
were when Rostker was decided). See also infra notes 430-33 and accompanying text
(detailing changed circumstances regarding numbers and duties of women in the
military, as well as the methods of fighting war, that would affect a Supreme Court
analysis of registration, as well as Selective Service and DoD acknowledgements that
the analysis would necessarily differ from that employed by the Rostker court).
424. See supra notes 124-33 and accompanying text (analyzing the deference
granted to Congress by the Rostker Court regarding defense-related decisions).
425. See John Lancaster, No More Draft? Pentagon Concedes Selective Service System May
Not Be Necessary, WASH. POST, Mar. 4, 1994, at A5 (quoting a DoD report to Congress
that asserted “with reduced force levels combined with two decades of successful
experience with raising and maintaining a volunteer force, . . . recent victorious
wartime experiences, and the quality of active and reserve personnel, it is highly
unlikely that we will have to reinstate the draft in the foreseeable future.”).
426. See supra notes 102-07 and accompanying text (discussing the Court’s view
that registration was wholly integrated with conscription and induction into the
military, primarily for combat duties from which women are prohibited, thus
providing a basis for the exclusion of women from registration).
427. The Rostker Court rejected the rational relation standard that the government
asked it to employ in analyzing the gender discrimination question. 453 U.S. 57, 6970 (1981). Instead it employed a greatly restricted heightened scrutiny standard,
which placed a burden on the complaining party to overcome the presumption that
the sexes were differently situated with regard to military service. See id. at 94
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (observing that the Rostker Court has required appellees to
prove that “a gender-neutral classification would substantially advance important
government interests,” rather than requiring the government to prove the same for
gender-based classifications); see also United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533
(1996) (asserting that where official classification based on gender is concerned, “the
burden of justification is demanding and it rests entirely on the State”).
428. The Rostker majority invoked scenarios requiring the drafting of large
numbers of primarily combat personnel, and reasoned that such a scenario offered
only a marginal role for women, which justified excluding them completely. See
supra notes 111-40 and accompanying text (discussing the shortcomings of that
analysis at the time and the greater shortcomings of applying that analysis under
current military circumstances).
429. These consequences are not insignificant. Approximately 2,946,115 men
were obligated to register during the years 2000-2001. 2001 ANNUAL REPORT, supra
note 260, at back end page. More than ten percent of them can be expected not to
register, based upon current Selective Service statistics. Id. at 8. Among the benefits
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by the Rostker Court, the current Court would have much more
430
difficulty upholding such a classification today. Women are a much
431
Furthermore, the
greater part of the contemporary armed forces.
432
armed forces are far less ground-force centered, with a higher
number of behind-the-lines support staff than at any time in U.S.
433
military history.
It is clear that if a draft were somehow needed, there would be a
434
great need for both women and men. It is clearer still that the draft
does not figure significantly in the future of the U.S. armed forces,
435
and that registration has outlived its original justification. Nothing
about the makeup of the current Court suggests that registration
436
The world has changed
would be held unconstitutional.
considerably, however, and such a decision would be in step with
current U.S. defense needs and with the more enduring U.S. ideals of
liberty and equality.

denied non-registrants are federal student loans. Id. at 7. The federal government
makes available up to $35,000 in Stafford loans to college students in a full-time fouryear program.
Dept of Educ., Stafford Loans at http://www.ed.gov/proginfo/SFA/studentguide/2000-1/staffordlimits.html (last visited Aug. 9, 2002) (on
file with author). If ten percent of the non-registrants in these years alone applied for
college loans and were denied, the funds denied would total more than $10 billion.
See also supra notes 415-17 and accompanying text (surveying other benefits and
privileges denied non-registrants, including drivers licenses and citizenship).
430. See Backgrounder, supra note 296 (quoting the conclusion of a DoD report that
noted that much of the congressional testimony relied upon by the Rostker Court
would be “inappropriate” to apply today due to the vastly changed circumstances in
the military, most particularly regarding the altered role of women).
431. See supra notes 254-55 and accompanying text (reporting the steady rise in
numbers of women in the military).
432. See CLODFELTER, supra note 118, at 238 (placing the percent of U.S. ground
troops to its total force at approximately ten percent in 1967, down from
approximately forty percent in World War II).
433. See id. at 238-39 (attributing the shifting ratio of support personnel to total
personnel in U.S. military operations both to the demands of modern weaponry and
to the comforts required by the modern soldier). See also supra notes 254-55 and
accompanying text (discussing the growth in percentage of jobs in the military open
to women, which is now approaching ninety percent, an indication of the percentage
of jobs that are not classified as combat positions).
434. The DoD recognizes this need despite the statutory combat limitation placed
on women. See O’Neill, supra note 248, at 180 (characterizing the current military
practice of accepting and assigning women into the armed forces with far less
prejudice than in the past, deploying them where individual preference, abilities,
and regulations dictate, with less regard for the differently situated status).
435. See Bandow, supra note 10 (asserting that President Carter called for draft
registration as a demonstration of strength in the face of Soviet aggression). Today
the United States is an unrivaled world power, yet draft registration remains. Id.
436. The three dissenting votes in Rostker, Justices White, Marshall, and Brennan,
are no longer on the Court. The author of the Rostker decision, Justice Rehnquist,
has since been elevated to Chief Justice.

